| Since the end of 2012, Beijing, Tianjin and the whole North China appeared high frequency long duration, affecting a wide range of large area of fog and haze, serious constraints to sustainable economic and social development, threatening people’s health.Since the main component of air pollutants PM2.5 has a cross-border long-distance transmission characteristics, the environmental pollution is no administrative divisions of the compartment, environmental protection must be given to regional cooperation. For solving the problem of air pollution control, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei three governments start joint prevention and control mechanism. Beijing, Tianjin and joint prevention and control of air pollution, although the mechanism has been established, but the three governments current governance model is still single air pollutant emission reduction targets to complete national distribution, since Beijing, Tianjin and economic strength, industrial layout, energy consumption and research different abilities and other factors, joint prevention and control during the three exist on some issues of conflict of interest, there has been excessive governance Beijing, Hebei weak pollution phenomena, resulting in a great waste of social resources and environmental resources to some extent. Moreover, joint prevention and control of air pollution is actually the development and protection of the game. In the process of air pollution, the three governments exist relations interests of the game, pay attention to short-term interests, ignoring air pollution control.In this paper, cooperative game model optimization model to solve regional cooperation in Beijing, Tianjin and optimal control of sulfur dioxide removal costs, the cost of pollution control before and after more cooperative. Shapley value based on rational allocation of income distribution method affiliate earnings cooperation after Beijing,Tianjin, socially efficient allocation of resources, Beijing, Tianjin and implement joint prevention and control of air pollution in the process win is important.Specific content is divided into six parts. The first part introduces the background and significance of the research, domestic and foreign scholars in the joint prevention and control of air pollution and the use of game theory environmental research progress in governance, this article describes issues to be studied. The second part describes the theoretical basis of this paper introduces the theory of externalities, non-cooperative gameand cooperative game theory. The need for cooperation to control air pollution in Beijing,Tianjin hazards introduced from the outside of the air pollution point of view, with a non-cooperative game and cooperative game theory to explain Beijing, Tianjin and joint prevention and control air pollution superiority. Part III describes the status of air pollution in Beijing, Tianjin, Beijing and Tianjin areas indicate air pollution situation is grim, Beijing,Tianjin and the three main sources of atmospheric pollution clearly differentiated. While in Beijing, Tianjin increased air pollution control efforts, but a lack of coordination governance policies. Income distribution model and Shapley value method to optimize fourth section describes the area, combined with the region in 2010 in Beijing, Tianjin and removing SO2 emission situation empirical analysis, the results showed that the removal of pollutants cooperation after cost significantly less than the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin individual pollutant removal costs. Part V describes the current mainstream of Beijing,Tianjin defense suggestions of joint control of air pollution, summed up the successful experience of inter-regional air pollution at home and abroad, according to the model results, the Beijing, Tianjin and joint prevention and control air pollution focus of future work. The last part is the conclusion, the research work summarized herein made, and points out the shortcomings and prospect research. |
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