Research On Evolutionary Game Of Low-carbon Innovation Network Governance Mechanism In Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing performance output is the main manifestation of China’s global competitiveness and comprehensive national strength.However,the problems exposed in the process of rapid development are increasingly prominent: excessive energy consumption,low utilization rate,and environmental pollution.These problems have always been further enhanced by the development level of China’s industrial enterprises.The revolutionary,disruptive,and breakthrough low-carbon technology innovation is a major trend and a growth point for realizing the evolution of the current economy to a high-quality development model.However,low-carbon innovation is difficult,long-term,and high-risk,which cannot be tolerated by a single company.With the help of low-carbon innovation networks,organizations can solve the problems of insufficient innovation ability,lack of resources,and low organizational performance in individual organizations through complementary advantages and synergies,improve organizational performance by increasing market competitiveness.However,the diversification,complexity,and information asymmetry of low-carbon innovation network nodes will inevitably lead to organizational contradictions,which may cause organizations to withdraw from low-carbon innovation networks.Therefore,how to achieve effective governance of low-carbon innovation networks is crucial to the development of China’s low-carbon economy.Firstly,the article sorts out the current research status,defines the related concepts of manufacturing enterprises,low-carbon innovation networks and governance mechanisms,and lays the foundation for the analysis of the following analysis angles,game subjects and game strategies.Then,based on the evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality,the income payment matrix of the manufacturing enterprise to maintain or exit the low-carbon innovation network under informal governance is constructed,according to the replication dynamic equation of the model,the equilibrium state of the system under informal governance is obtained,using the numerical simulation tool Matlab to adjust reputation loss(D)to explore the changes in the evolutionary behavior of manufacturing companies under the influence of reputation mechanism.In the fifth chapter,the article further introduces liquidated damages(f)and penalty costs(t)to construct a new model to obtain the evolutionary game model of low-carbon innovation cooperation of manufacturing enterprises under formal governance,and then obtain the system stability points under different conditions,the phase diagrams of system evolution under different conditions are obtained adjusting the liquidated damages f to examine the evolutionary path changes of the game subject under formal governance.Finally,based on the results of numerical analysis and numerical analysis,it provides guidance for the governance of low-carbon innovation networks under informal governance and formal governance,and provides a theoretical basis for promoting the stability of low-carbon innovation networks.