| In China, the electricity sector reforming is now going on in characteristics for introducing competition and so-called conception of Regional Electricity Market. As one of the most important participants, the generation company are mainly focus on how to earn maximize profits through taking a proper bidding strategy in the condition of electricity market. This present dissertation investigated this issue comprehensively and systemically applying Evolutionary Game Theory on the base of a refined survey for the China's unique Regional Electricity Market.The dissertation looked back the reconstructive process of China's power industry and history of Regional Electricity Market. From the following aspects such as market structure, trade pattern, price making, market body diversity and alteration in market circumstance, three founder mental characteristics were summarized particularly. The first one is mode classification for China's electricity, including Single-Sided market, Two-Sided market and Multi-Sided market. The second one is concerned with bounded rational subjects of bidding and imperfect information of market system. The last one is focus on the prominent inter-province differences in China's Regional Electricity Market, which are manifested in stage of development, extent to bear an high electricity price, power generation structure within a certain province and power plants properties. The dissertation then developed several mathematic models to cover with above founder mental characteristics.To cover the first and the second characteristic, the dissertation applied a homogeneous multi-population evolutionary game model to investigate bidding behaviors in the case of "Multi-Seller Single-Buyer" Regional Electricity Market. Bidding strategies of there various types of generation companies were demonstrated respectively for margin and shortage market. To cover the third characteristic, an inter-province difference coefficient and a plant adjustment coefficient were simultaneously introduced to the above model to compare with bidding strategies without introducing these coefficients. The comparing results indicated as followings. When there is a shortage market situation, both of the above two coefficients could be neglected. As shortage extent increasing, the proportion of generation companies to bidding high ris(?)ster. When there is an abundant market situation, for the effects of the above two c(?)cients, weather a generation company bids successfully or not will not depends on b(?)ng strategies absolutely any more.In the case of "Multi-Seller Multi-Buyer" Regional Electricity Market, the dissertation app(?) an asymmetric two-population evolutionary game model to investigate genera(?)n companies'bidding behaviors. In the case, a generation company gambled not only with the other generation companies but also with grid companies. To solve the model (?)ccessfully, the dissertation had recourse to an approach based on Quasi-Birth-Dea(?) process (QBD) and RG-factorization algorithm. A numerical example was c(?)ed to review the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) under two kinds of the profit matrix for generation companies.What's more, to cover the third characteristic, an inter-province difference coefficient and a plant adjustment coefficient were simultaneously introduced to the above model as above to develop a new model. Then the dissertation applied this new model to simulate the reality bidding behaviors in East China Regional Electricity Market. A calculated result compared with the former model had illustrated that when inter-province differences have to be involved in the evolutionary game model, the model would be more competent to conduct the bidding practice in China's Regional Electricity Market. Even in the Two-Sided market circumstance, the later model can consider power plants'benefit comes from different provinces. Also it could afford a relatively fair deal between generation companies and grid companies come from different provinces. |
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