The Study On Opportunistic Behavior Of The Construction Supervisor

Abstract:On the basis of the research integration of domestic and foreign achievement in the construction supervisor, the opportunistic behavior model, influential factors and performance of construction supervisor fall in the scope of the main research. We apply the principal-agent theory to investigate the ideal state of construction supervisor’s behavior, its conditions as well as the opportunistic behavior model of the construction supervisor:laziness model and collusion model. With the application of relevant principle of management, we have studied the behavior of antecedent and consequence variables of the construction supervisor on the basis of the actual results of the interviews and have provided the theoretical support to optimize the performance of construction supervisor’s behavior.(1) The construction supervisor’s behavior has a feature of two-dimensional:direction and strength. We define the opportunistic behavior of construction supervisor according to the "two-dimensional". Laziness of the construction supervisor is considered to be one of opportunistic behaviors in terms of strength in a right direction but an insufficient one. Collusion of the construction supervisor is thought to be one of opportunistic behaviors, in which the construction supervisor’s behavior may divert from the owner interest. Research includes the conditions of the lazy behavior,formation mechanism and laziness prevention. It has been studied in the paper in connection with the relationship between insider control, lack of independence and occurrence of collusion as well as the collusion analysis in terms of the information structure and construction supervisor reputation and collusion collapsing mechanism, etc.(2) Empirical study on the influential factors of construction supervisor’s behavior includes the selection of behavior influential factors related assumptions, hypothesis testing, the indicators in line with descriptive statistics and test results; Performance research includes test ideas, related assumptions, method and project analysis, structural equation model analysis on the performance of construction supervisor’s behavior and performance evaluation of the behavior based on fuzzy recognition analysis. Difference in project nature (ownership, investment volume and level) will lead to the changes of the construction supervisor’s working environment, in which the performance of the construction supervisors varies significantly. The owner and the builder have different attitude of acceptance and cooperation towards the construction supervisor’s behavior in the project of different nature.The characteristics of the construction project plays an important role in the behavior of the construction supervisor. The difference of engineering properties (ownership, investment and level) will cause environment changes of construction supervisor, and the performance of the construction supervisor also varies significantly different. In the different nature of the project, the owner and the builder have different recognition degree on the construction supervisor’s behavior. As for the work performance and social performance, the construction supervisor has high performance in state-owned super-size project, lower performance in private construction projects and lowest in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering. Construction supervisor’s quality control and progress control shows great differences between the state-owned large construction projects and the state-owned large and medium-sized construction projects. The reason may be that the construction supervisor could obtain sufficient supervision authority in former condition.In addition, under different condition of ownership, supervisor’s behavior performance seems to be different, and supervisor’s quality control and progress control is weak in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering performance of the private large-scale project. This is likely to the reason that there are differences in the interests and target constraints between the owner representative of state-owned construction and private construction owner.(4) Good reputation mechanism is regarded as an important condition of enhancing the China’s construction supervisor’s independence and improving the supervisor’s behavior performance.The "insider control" of State-owned employer representative may increase the possibility of collusion because of the lack of necessary independence of the supervisor. When "insider control" becomes strengthening, the supervisor’s independence becomes weaker. When the reputation mechanism acts on, the construction supervisor’s independence becomes strengthening. The Supervisor’s independence depends on the relative power of reputation mechanism.Reputation forcing on the "insider control" are realized by means of enhancing the independence of the construction supervisor, which is in essence the result of power comparison between the market force and the government force. A free market-oriented mechanism of construction supervisor will provide a full independence to the construction supervisor with the help of reputation mechanism. It is an effective path to curb the adverse situation of "bad money over good money" and obtain an effective performance of construction supervisor’s behavior.