Research On Enterprise Credit Inequality And Government Implicit Guarantee Strength Measurement

The practice of forty years of reform and opening up shows that in the process of China's rapid rise,the private economy has played an important role in promoting economic growth and solving employment pressure.In 2017,60%of the total GDP of the society came from the private sector.In the economy,the number of people employed by private enterprises accounts for more than 80%of the total employment of the whole society.However,while private enterprises have created huge social wealth and made great contributions to the realization of social and economic stability,the social credit funds occupied by the private economy have shown extreme asymmetry."Difficult financing and expensive financing" have always plagued our private economy This bottleneck is not only not conducive to the optimal allocation of social resources,but also restricts the structural adjustment and upgrading of the private economy to a considerable extent.Especially when the macro economy is under downward pressure,it even endangers the survival of private enterprises to a certain extent.How to clear the bottleneck of private enterprise development in the process of China's economic development under the basic socialist economic system with Chinese characteristics,and achieve balanced development of the state-owned economy and the private economy.It not only fully reflects the superiority of the basic economic system of socialism with Chinese characteristics,but also maximizes the optimal allocation of social resources.This is not only a major theoretical issue,but also a major realistic issue that China is currently facing to deepen its economic system reform.There is no doubt that in order to clear the bottlenecks in the development of private enterprises in China's economic development,the first problem is to understand the reasons that lead to "difficult and expensive financing" for private enterprises.The"financing difficulties and expensive financing" of private enterprises are relatively relative to state-owned enterprises.That is to say,commercial banks have given higher credit ratings to similar state-owned enterprises in corporate financing activities.Therefore,the crux of the problem comes down to this:why commercial banks will give similar state-owned enterprises higher credit ratings,and to what extent.This article attempts to use a data-driven research paradigm to conduct a comprehensive and systematic research on this issue,with a view to providing a basic reference for further deepening the reform of the economic system.Based on a systematic review of relevant research literatures,this paper combined the relevant actual data of listed companies in China,and used the KMV model and PSM matching model to measure the credit status of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in financing activities,respectively.Firstly,the existence of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises was confirmed from the perspective of practical evidence;secondly,based on the heterogeneity of corporate governance structure between state-owned and private enterprises,the government "paternalism"existed in the operation of state-owned enterprises Factors,theoretically and practically demonstrated that the process of corporate financing in China has corporate credit enhancement stemming from implicit government guarantees,giving credit enhancement to state-owned enterprises is only a market selection behavior of commercial banks under implicit government guarantees,and this behavior has Obvious administrative level heterogeneity;once again based on the reality of the heterogeneity of the implicit guarantee capability of provincial governments in China.the regional heterogeneity of the degree of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises has been demonstrated in practice,and the implicit guarantee strength of the government has been tested.Regional comparative analysis;Finally,aiming at the reality of state-owned enterprises 'credit enhancement caused by the government 's implicit guarantee under the government's paternalism",this paper further analyzes the economic consequences of this realistic background and the path to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.select.The analysis of the full text yields the following basic conclusions:(1)In the financing activities of Chinese enterprises,commercial banks do give higher credit ratings to state-owned enterprises,which is the direct cause of "difficult and expensive financing"for private enterprises;(2)The higher credit rating given to state-owned enterprises by commercial banks is their market selection behavior determined by the government's implicit guarantee under the government's "paternalism";(3)the degree of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises not only has administrative level heterogeneity,but also exists Obvious regional heterogeneity;(4)On the one hand,the credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises has led to distortions in the allocation of social resources,which has reduced the efficiency of macroeconomic operations to a certain extent,and on the other hand,it has transferred business risks to the government and increased The possibility of systemic risk outbreaks,of which the local government debt risk is particularly noteworthy;(5)The way to solve the "difficult and expensive financing" of private enterprises lies in deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises,and fully implementing the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.State-owned enterprises are transformed from equity control to capital participation,thereby weakening the government's "paternalism" Implicit government guarantee.The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in three aspects:first,the use of a data-driven research paradigm confirms the existence of state-owned enterprise credit enhancement in practice,and reveals the direct reasons for "difficult and expensive financing" of private enterprises;It is demonstrated that the root of the credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises lies in the government's implicit guarantee under the "paternalism" of the government.In practice,giving credit enhancement to state-owned enterprises is only a market choice of commercial banks,not discrimination against private enterprises.The degree of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises has both heterogeneity at the administrative level and heterogeneity at the administrative level.Based on a systematic review of relevant research literatures,this paper combined the relevant actual data of listed companies in China,and used the KMV model and PSM matching model to measure the credit status of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in financing activities,respectively.Firstly,the existence of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises was confirmed from the perspective of practical evidence;secondly,due to the heterogeneity of governance structure between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,and the government's"paternalism" in the operation Therefore,it is proved from the perspective of theory and practice that the credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises is due to the implicit government guarantee.Credit enhancement for state-owned enterprises is only a market selection behavior of commercial banks,and this behavior has administrative level heterogeneity.Third,based on the reality of the heterogeneity of implicit guarantee capabilities of provincial governments in China,the credit of state-owned enterprises has been demonstrated in practice.The regional heterogeneity of the degree of enhancement,and a regional comparative analysis of the government's implicit guarantee strength;Finally,this paper analyzes the credit enhancement caused by the government's implicit guarantee under the government's "paternalism".The economic consequences brought by the realistic background,and the choice of ways to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.The full analysis shows the following basic conclusions:(1)In the financing activities of Chinese enterprises,commercial banks do give higher credit ratings to state-owned enterprises,which is the direct cause of "difficult financing and expensive financing"for private enterprises;(2)The higher credit rating given by banks to state-owned enterprises is a market selection behavior determined by the government's implicit guarantee under the government's"paternalism";(3)The degree of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises not only has administrative level heterogeneity,but also obvious regional heterogeneity;(4)On the one hand,the credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises has led to distortions in the allocation of social resources and reduced to a certain extent It improves the efficiency of macroeconomic operations,on the other hand,it transfers business operating risks to the government,and increases the possibility of systemic risk outbreaks.Among them,the risk of local government debt is particularly noteworthy.(5)Resolving the "financing difficulties,expensive financing”approach is to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises,fully implement the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,and transform state-owned enterprises from equity control to capital participation,thereby weakening the government's implicit guarantee under the "paterrnalism" of the government.The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in three aspects:first,the use of a data-driven research paradigm confirms the existence of state-owned enterprise credit enhancement in practice,and reveals the direct reasons for "difficult and expensive financing" of private enterprises;It is demonstrated that the root of the credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises lies in the government's implicit guarantee under the "paternalism" of the government.In practice,giving credit enhancement to state-owned enterprises is only a market choice of commercial banks,not discrimination against private enterprises.The degree of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises has both heterogeneity at the administrative level and region.