Study On Industry Characteristics,Market Competition,and The Mixed Ownership Reform Of Stated-owned Enterprises

Since 1978,the reform of state-owned enterprises has been the main line of reform and opening up,and it has achieved demonstrable results.The vitality and competitiveness of state-owned enterprises have been gradually strengthened,and the structure and layout of state-owned economy have been gradually optimized,which greatly promoted the development of national economy and society.However,we should also see that the construction of well-off society and the reform are at a critical stage,the situation of low operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises has not been fundamentally changed.It is encouraging that the 'Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform' proposes the following.As mixed ownership is an important vehicle for the national economy,we should push the property rights system to make the vast majority of state-owned enterprises into mixed ownership enterprises,and let markets play a decisive role in allocating resources.How to actively develop a diversified ownership economy has become a real problem to be solved.To be more specific,since every state-owned enterprise is in different industry,then,how to give attention to the impact of industry characteristics about the optimal mixed proportion of stated-owned enterprises?A standard theoretical framework is needed to explore it.According to the existing literature,the literature on the optimal mixed proportion of state-owned enterprises is less,and can be included into two:one is the influence of the internal production efficiency of the state-owned enterprises on the optimal mixed proportion;the other is the influence of the external competition extent of state-owned enterprises on the optimal mixed proportion.This paper follows the external environment of state-owned enterprises,which is that the optimal mixed proportions of stated-owned enterprises is affected by the industry characteristics,such as negative externalities,foreign penetration and market position.The industry characteristics lead to the change of social environment and market structure,which change the profit level of the enterprises and the welfare level of the whole society,eventually,the optimal mixed proportion of stated-owned enterprises is been affected.Therefore,under the framework of mixed oligopoly competition,this paper respectively discusses the industry characteristics of negative externalities,foreign penetration and market position on state-owned and private enterprises,government decision on the mixed ownership reform,and other relevant issues.The dissertation is divided into six chapters.The first chapter briefly introduces the background and significance of the thesis topics,and then combs the research ideas and framework of this study,and finally points out the possible innovation and deficiency of this paper.The second chapter introduces the basic concepts of the theory of property rights,policy burden theory and mixed oligopoly theory,and then sorts out and comments on related literatures both in domestic and foreign,providing theoretical basis for this study.The third chapter is the analysis of the impact of the negative externalities on the mixed ownership reform of stated-owned enterprises.In this chapter,negative production externalities are introduced into the mixed oligopoly model.We construct a mixed oligopoly model of a stateowned enterprise who operates with mixed ownership competing with private enterprises who produces negative externalities in the same market to analyze the optimal mixed proportion of stated-owned enterprises.The fourth chapter is the analysis of the impact of foreign penetration on the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.In this chapter,international joint ventures are introduced into the mixed oligopoly model.We construct a mixed oligopoly model of a state-owned enterprise who operates with mixed ownership competing with domestic private enterprises and international joint ventures in the same market to analyze the optimal mixed proportion of stated-owned enterprises.The fifth chapter is the analysis of the impact of market position on the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.First of all,according to the market position of state-owned enterprises,the competitive mode is divided into the following:the synchronous mode of decision making,the leading mode of the state-owned enterprises,and the following mode of the state-owned enterprises.Secondly,the equilibrium results and the optimal mixed proportions of statedowned enterprises of three competitive models are analyzed respectively.And lastly,the three competitive models are compared by calculating the equilibrium social welfare.The sixth chapter is the policy recommendation of this article.This chapter puts forward some targeted suggestions on the basis of the previously analysis of the industry characteristics and its mechanism of action to provide theoretical guidance for further reform.Through a systematic theoretical analysis,our findings are as follows:(1)Under the condition that the production efficiency of the state-owned enterprise is lower than that of the private enterprise,no matter the industry characteristics,the realization of the mixed ownership of the state owned enterprises has a certain requirement to the production efficiency,namely,the initial cost of the state-owned enterprise is not more than a certain cost critical value.(2)For the government with a goal of maximizing(net)social welfare,the optimal mixed proportion of stated-owned enterprises depends on the capacity of state-owned enterprises to bear the social burden and the size of the social burden.The capacity or the social burden is greater,and the optimal mixed ratio is smaller;conversely,the capacity or the social burden is smaller,and the optimal mixed ratio is larger.(3)The optimal policy of the government is not the same under different market position of state-owned enterprises.When the competitive mode is the synchronous mode of decision making,the optimal strategy of the government is to start the mixed ownership reform;when the competitive mode is the leading or following mode of the state-owned enterprises,the optimal strategy of the government is complete state control.According to the different effects of market position,the government should adopt differential privatization strategies for the state-owned enterprises to guarantee social welfare.Moreover,in order to realize the maximization of social welfare,the optimal position for a state-owned enterprise is neither a leader nor a follower but a participant of market competition.