Research On Mixed Ownership Reforming,State-owned Enterprises' Investment Efficiency And The Equity Characteristics

In November 2013,the release of the "Decision on Comprehensively Deepening Several Major Issues in Reform" marked the mixed ownership reform of the state-owned enterprise into development stage.In this special era,this paper takes the non-financial state-owned enterprises reforming in 2010-2014 as a sample.By comparing the non-efficiency investment levels of the two years before and after the reform,this paper explores the investment efficiency of the state-owned enterprises and analyzes the impact of changes in equity balance and shareholding ratio of executives caused by mixed reform on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.Based on the Richardson model,this paper establishes an investment efficiency measurement model to calculate the non-efficiency investment level of enterprises.Firstly,the sample is divided according to the reform year,the degree of equity checks and balances and the holding method,and these samples are paired T test for the non-efficiency investment level.The results show that:thanks to policy support,the number of state-owned enterprises participating in the mixed reforms has surged and the efficiency of state-owned enterprises has increased significantly.The investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises that are absolutely controlled before the reform is better.The effect of reform is more significant with the increase in the proportion of non-public production.The state-owned enterprises whose equity balance less than 1 can make a significant increase in investment efficiency and excessive equity,but Excessive equity balances will intensify the company's inefficient investment.To further confirm the hypothesis,this paper constructs a multiple linear regression model of equity-related variables,the empirical analysis shows that the reform of state-owned enterprises in mixed ownership can indeed bring about a significant increase in investment efficiency and perform better in suppressing excessive investment behavior;the increase in equity balance will reduce investment efficiency and further divide the further sample regression finds that equity balance can only inhibit excessive investment,and have no significant effect on under-investment;the increase in the shareholding ratio of executives can also inhibit the low-efficiency investment of state-owned enterprises,but the suppression of excessive investment is more significant.Finally,combined with the results of statistical tests and regression analysis,it puts forward suggestions for state-owned enterprises to curb non-efficiency investment:first of all,we must spare no effort to vigorously develop mixed ownership economy,reduce the entry threshold of non-public capital,choose appropriate holding method,state-owned relative holding and shareholding companies should pay attention to the degree of dispersion of equity;secondly,introduce non-public production points actively,give non-public capital more discourse power,form equity checks and balances,but pay attention to grasp the scale;finally,improve management hiring and incentive mechanism,and introduce market competition mechanism and grasp the autonomy,improve the management evaluation system,and focus on the design of the equity incentive mechanism.