Industry Competition,Mixed Ownership Reform Of State-owned Enterprises And Enterprise Performance

The prime objective of state-owned enterprise(SOE)reform is to enhance its economy,effectiveness and efficiency.Since 1984,the mixed ownership reform has been regarded as an important task in SOE refoim.Moreover,a key breakthrough of the mixed ownership reform for the time being of SOEs is in the highly competitive industiy.As a consequence,it remains an empirical question that whether mixed ownership reform could improve the performance of SOEs in highly competitive industry,and that whether it could function differently as the deepness of reform changes.Frist,this paper reviews the relevant literature on industry competitiveness,mixed ownership reform and film performance.Then,based on property ownership theory,principal-agent theory and control right theory,this paper develop the relevant hypotheses and try to probe into the interaction mechanism between mixed ownership reform and corporate performance,and use samples involved in mixed ownership reform from 2008 to 2016 and find the following results:(1)Companies performs poorly as the industry to which the companies belong gets competitive.(2)Depth of mixed ownership reform and balance of mixed ownership reform are two main aspect of SOE?s reform,and both of them are positively related to firm performance.This indicates that mixed ownership reform for SOEs could effectively improve fn*m performance,especially in highly competitively industry;(3)No matter whether the control rights have changed or not due to the mixed ownership reform of SOEs,the depth of mixed ownership reform could always play as a moderating role,alleviating the negative effect on the industry competitiveness and firm performance.(4)Comparing with the firms whose control rights have changed,the moderating role of balance of mixed ownership reform is more significant in the firms whose control rights have not been changed.What is more,when a SOE becomes a non-SOE after mixed ownership reform,the balance of mixed ownership reform seems to be a sword,which exacerbates the negative relationship between then.Specifically,as the owner of the company becomes a non-SOE entity,he or she are more inclined to be involved in what we call management opportunism,using tunnel to do damage to the interest of minority shareholders.(5)Compared with enterprises with weak internal control,the balance of mixed ownership reform functions better in compaPies with high internal control quality,but the depth of mixed ownership reform could play a role in all companies,whatever the intermal control quality is.Based on the conclusion above,our suggestions are as follows:Firstly,our country should still promote the mixed ownership reform for SOEs in competitive industries vigorously;Secondly,the process of mixed ownership reform for SOEs need to be in caution about the depth of the reform.Meanwhile,we should be cautious about the balance of the reform,avoiding the change of control right,which might cause the loss of state-owned assets in the process of the mixed ownership reform for SOEs.At last,the SOEs also should pay attention to the importance of intermal controls.By improving the internal controls,the mixed ownership reform for SOEs can play a good role.Tliis paper helps clarify the mechanism of mixed reform for SOEs on enter:prise performance,provide the empirical evidence of the mixed reform for SOEs on competitive industry,and enrich the achievements of the mixed reform.