On Tax Sharing,Industrial Growth And Industrial Land Allocation Behavior Of Local Government

In the 40 years of reform and opening up,China's industrial growth has entered a new historical height,which is due to the direct allocation and indirect intervention of China's growth-oriented local governments in economic and social development.Against this background,a large amount of resources are driven,centralized and controlled,and used for industrial purposes.In this process,the production factors that play a key role are land resources.China's special land system arrangement has given local governments monopoly power to control land allocation,and has become an important driving force for rapid industrialization,and has thus formed a model of'developing by land' with Chinese characteristics.While reshaping the relationship between the central and local governments,the tax-sharing reform in 1994 has also indirectly affected the behavior patterns of local governments.This is because different fiscal relations design will form different fiscal incentives,thus affecting local government behavior,and then acting on the economic performance of the jurisdiction.Based on the above understanding,this paper selects the core fiscal distribution relationship among the tax-sharing system-the tax sharing system and the land allocation behavior of the city and county governments as the research object,and discusses the Chinese-style fiscal incentives and urban land allocation issues,in order to better understand the institutional incentives behind the trajectory of China's industrial growth and operation,which provides an important theoretical and empirical reference for the future reform of the fiscal incentive system.From the perspective of fiscal incentives,this paper takes the practice of tax sharing system reform under the provincial taxation system since the tax distribution system in 1994 as the research background,and regards the proportion of tax revenue directly faced by local governments as a measure of fiscal incentives.The logical framework of this paper is as follows:First,we examine the impact of tax sharing incentives on regional industrial growth.Then,using the local government industrial land allocation behavior as an entry point of view,we further study the mechanism of the impact of tax sharing incentives on regional industrial growth,and thus link the two core systems under the Chinese-style decentralization-the tax sharing system and the land system.It also links the direct fiscal incentives faced by local governments with the important tools they can control.Then,starting from the impact effect and the impact mechanism obtained from the above analysis,we investigate the strategic behavior of local governments to reduce industrial land prices for the allocation of industrial land under the tax sharing incentives.Finally,we draw conclusions and related enlightenments with certain meanings.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:First,this paper explores the industrial growth effect of VAT sharing incentives.The results show that under the fiscal incentives of increasing VAT sharing ratio for the local regions,the industrial output value will increase accordingly.In addition to the absolute scale,the relative structure of the industry has also changed significantly,and the industrial share has been significantly improved.Second,this paper studies the impact of the VAT sharing incentives on industrial land allocation.The results show that under the fiscal incentives for the increasing VAT sharing incentives,local governments will increase the allocation of industrial land.In addition to the absolute scale,the relative allocation structure of different types of land has also changed significantly,and the proportion of industrial land has been significantly improved.Third,this paper examines the impact of the VAT sharing incentives on industrial land prices.The results show that the higher VAT sharing incentives that local governments face,the lower the regional industrial land price.Moreover,based on the premise that there is a significant positive industrial land price strategy interaction between regions,the increasing VAT sharing incentives strengthens the interaction between regional industrial land price strategies.In addition,the heterogeneity test found that whether for industrial growth,industrial land allocation or industrial land prices,the efect of VAT sharing incentives will be more clearly reflected in areas with strong industrial base,fiscal self-sufficiency and high value-added tax dependence,which is consistent with the fiscal incentive logic.In summary,under the incentives of VAT sharing,the local government's efforts to improve the VAT tax base and behavioral performance have significantly improved,and in this process,land has become an important strategic tool that is directly controllableBased on the above research results,we believes that under the new situation that China's current economy shifts from high-speed growth stage to high-quality development stage,it is necessary to optimize the design of fiscal incentive mechanism with tax-sharing system as its core.This practice will guide the local governments to shift its growth pattern from the traditional growth mode driven by land resources to a new growth model driven by productivity and innovation.Furthermore,it is nessesary to shift the local government's focus from the traditional industrial land price investment competition to the competition in the business environment and other areas related to the regional comparative advantage,which will promote the rational flow of resource elements.