Research On The Governance Mechanism Of Mixed-ownership Enterprises From The Perspective Of State-owned Enterprise Reform

The reform state-owned enterprise(SOE)has been carried out many times since 1978 and the mixed-ownership reform(MWR),regarded as a new breakthrough recently,is supposed to transform the single state-owned enterprises into mixed-ownership enterprises with state-owned and non-state-owned capitals.From the micro-view,there's a premise hidden in the mixed-ownership reform of SOE that the market-featured mechanism,brought with non-state-owned capitals,could enhance the market-orientation of SOE.But if the latent logic that mixed capitals can optimize the mechanism could work,how does it be realized and what are the internal and external conditions in the process of its realization?It is significantly important to answer the questions for the success and failure of policies and it has same importance in the view of general theory because it is related to thegoverance mechanism'seffictivenessof mixed-ownership enterprises.Though it rarely indicates that the questions are not concerned by the academic community,few the positive considerations or solutions are given and most of the related published research results are of the repeated verifications on the relevance between the mix-ownership enterprises and one or several performance indicators.This paper is not meant to solve the above problems arrogantly but make them as the start point of the conception.So,started from State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASACSC),the most important external management structure of SOE,this paper analyzes the thinking logic theoretically with the beginning of the supervision of state-owned capital,then the governance dilemma of SOE,consequently,the input of different stock rights,which followed with the creation of mechanism of counterbalance and rectification,finally,the establishment of new governance structure.Based on the Principle-agency Theory,this paper analyzes the supervision system of state-owned capital and its traits firstly.Due to the dilemma of collective actions,the state-owned capital could not be managed by its legal owners.Its supervision and management is entrusted to the government through several levels of agencies by agreement and the residual rights of control is transferred at the same time with concerns of efficiency.The government,featured with internal professional division,combines the supervision management and other collective commissions and goals,then divides them into different missions and entrusts to different departments.Thus a supervision system of SOE composed encompassing the SASACSC,Ministry of Organization(MO),Ministry of Finance,Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security and so on.A relationship of common agency is set up between these departments and SOEs.Meanwhile,in the principal-agency relation between the supervisors and their regulatory targets,there exists remarkable incompleteness in the contract with which a vast amount of residual items couldn't be contractual or assigned to many supervision departments which only located at the middle of the principal(agent)hierarchywithout residual claim right but regular salary.Exercising the residual controlright features great externalities and it often switches between the omissions,caused by less motivation and disordered actions,caused by non-constraint over results.The omissions lead to inadequate supervision while disorders generate over-regulation and distortion,consequently,the supervision of state-owned capital and enterprises switches between the over-control and non-control.These departments which get powerful residual control right from the incompleteness of supervision contract are called comprehensive supervision departments such as SASACSC and MO.The comprehensive supervision departments,facing with the vast non-contractual residual items,are inclined to strengthen the organizational relationship to internalize the residual items and the probable uncertainties.And this kind of endeavors make the supervision methods administrative furtherly.Comparatively,the other supervision departments make the pre-contracts complete and explicit with their objects.With few residual items,this kind of relationships is approximate to a complete contractual relation.These involved departments are called professional supervision departments.Secondly,according to the above traits of supervision of state-owned capital,this paper researches the issues,which exist in the current SOEs,regarded related significantly to the supervision of state-owned capital to a large extent.Taking the common agent from the multi-departments make the SOEs exhausted in the diverse and alternative goals and missions.The inefficient supervision,caused by the externality of residual control right,is connected strongly to the "insider control" of SOEs,the over-regulation and distortion make the entrepreneurs bureaucratized,and the administrative ways and means restrain the SOEs' market-orientation.Furtherly,the dilemma of internal management of SOEs makes inputting the non-state-ownership stockholder to shape mixed-ownership enterprise as the way to optimize the internal management structure.Theoretically,it could input the market mechanism and could generate an optimized management mechanism through deviations corrections.For example,the orientation of investment and earning of the non-state-owned major shareholders could check and balance the dilemma caused by multi-goals and diverse missions and reduce the policy burdens and social responsibilities;the market mechanism embedded by non-state-owned stockholders could correct the SOEs' bureaucratization and administrativization;promote the administrative management to economic management which mainly focused on market by way of replacing the administrative relationship with contractual relationship;counterbalance the state-owned shareholder' s managerial behaviors by the non-state-owned shareholders aiming at their ownership so as to relieve the common"insider control phenomenons and reduce the costs of the first and second kind agents.This paper observes that the nature of mixed-ownship enterprises could impulse the supervision of state-owned capital converts from the administrative supervision to shareholder supervision.Finally,this paper establishes a microscopic balance logic on the basis of predecessores' researches.There exist internal differences between the non-state-owned shareholders and state-owned ones in the utility goals,identities and behavior logics.That is the inherent reason of counterbalance from the different stock equity.The controlling right over the cash flow which beyonds the cost of counterbalance become its realistic reason.But the actions of counterbalance depend on the abilities endowed from the ratio of the stock equity.To illustrate the microscopic operation of counterbalance logic,according to a typical case,this paper analyzes the usual action strategies from the counterbalance shareholders:competing for the positions in the board of directors and supervisors and overseeing the decision-making,allying the relevant shareholders to strengthen the power of discourse and constraining the state-owned shareholders legally.Plus,based on the public datas of listed manufactural companies,this paper checks the relationship between counterbalance extent and the agency costs.Far from the usual ratio between the second to fifth or tenth and the first,this paper considers it's rarerealistictally to take collective counterbalance among the shareholders from the second to fifth.So the ratio between the second shareholder and the first is set to replace the former one.It is found that the extent of counterbalance isn't somewhat hign according to the samples statistically.The regression analysis supports the hypothesis that the counterbalance could reduce the cost of first kind agency.When the ownership of second shareholder is added to this concern,it doesn't support the hypothesis that the second shareholder could reduce the agency cost.Based on the above theoretical study and the calculating check and case analysis,this paper makes the following conclusions:there are external reasons commit to the internal problems in the dilemma of SOEs' management.The main factor of the external reasons lies in the comprehensive supervision departments of SASACSC.But the majority of the predecessors' researches considerded the SASACSC as an integration,simplify the analysis to some extent and cover the root of the reasons.This paper deems the externalities of the residual control right of comprehensive supervision departments and their supervision's administrations are the main causes of the management problems of SOEs.This conclusion would not be altered even the minor non-state-owned capitals inputted.That is to say,the advantages of the internal management in the mixed-ownership SOEsare hard to show up unless clarifying the relationship between the new mixed-ownership SOEs and the comprehensive supervision departments.This paper regards also the comparative advantages of management of mixed-ownership SOEs depend on the counterbalance of stock equity.It is truly important of the counterbalance which derived from the internal motivation(which is not confirmed by the statistical check),but the counterbalance actions depend directly on the power of cash flow and the ratio of shareholding.Only if the proportion of stock equity increases to a certain degree could strengthen the power of cash flow and the ability of counterbalance,then could the motivation drive the actions occur.