Optimization Of The System Of State-owned Enterprises Agent

Chinese state-owned enterprises are the pillars of the national economy; The reform of Chinese state-owned enterprise is the central link in economic restructuring. Operators of state-owned enterprises are very important as particular social resources in a market economy for the reform and development of state-owned enterprises. However, in a special Chinese economic system, principal-agent relationship of Chinese state-owned enterprises has its own unique characteristics. It appeared in problems in the principal-agent risk which derived from a number of questions, resulting in state-owned business inefficiency and corruption. In order to improve the competitiveness of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises must study the causes of the risk agent in theory to mobilize the enthusiasm of the operators, fatherly improving the operation of incentive and restraint mechanisms in state-owned enterprises of our country's. Including the establishment of the remuneration system adapting to modern enterprise, fatherly improving the performance of operators for appraisals system; The main constraints on the incentives for reform and so on in order to set up system of operators fitting in accordance with the basic national conditions of China state-owned enterprises.This article is for the purpose of construction on the incentive and restraint mechanisms basing on managers of state-owned enterprise, commissioning principal-agent as the main line, focusing finally into China's construction enterprises on risk agent. This study is structured as follows, the first chapter, preface, introduced background of the problem , research significance and research in this article; The second chapter made a detailed expression on the risk of principal-agent and agent's basic theory, the emergence and development of principal-agent theory, as well as the risk of the emergence of agent; Chapter III made an analysis on the agent and principal-agent relationship of Chinese state-owned enterprises and the Chinese state-owned assets in the special circumstances combining with the risks in front of the agent and Chinese national conditions; the fourth chapter focus on the China's state-owned enterprises for the issues raised in front to optimize the proposed agent system; the fifth chapter summarized the results in this article.