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Research On The Dynamic Sharing Mechanism Of Industry-University Cooperation Innovation Revenue

Posted on:2021-08-23Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:L YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1489306032961549Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The theory and application of Industry-University cooperation innovation have developed rapidly in recent decades.Enterprises,universities,research institutes,and governments have realized that multi-organizational cooperative innovation can play an important role in the development and progress of science and technology.Various organizations participate in the process of Industry-University cooperation innovation actively to seek opportunities for innovation and development through the accumulation of capital,technology,knowledge,talent and policies.Although the related research on Industry-University cooperation innovation has attracted the attention of the academic circles and achieved considerable results in practice,but some important issues such as the dynamic process of Industry-University cooperation innovation,the formation mechanism of cooperative equilibrium,the quantification of cooperation innovation revenue,and the evolution of revenue disposal still need to be further studied.Based on domestic and foreign research,this thesis used a variety of theoretical methods comprehensively to study the dynamic sharing of Industry-University cooperation innovation revenue,in order to provide a useful complement to enrich and improve the theory of innovation management of Industry-University cooperation,formulate Industry-University cooperation innovation strategies,and guide Industry-University collaboration innovation activities.This thesis analyzed the commonalities and characteristics between Industry-University cooperation innovation and other forms of cooperative innovation based on the review of domestic and foreign literature,combined the four main goals of economic,technological,knowledge,and social in Industry-University cooperation innovation on the base of life cycle theory and linear model of cooperative innovation.The process of Industry-University cooperation innovation was divided into initial stages,progression stage,mature stage and transformation stage,and a "four goals and four stages" model was proposed as the basis of dynamic research.The initial stage was the starting point of the of Industry-University cooperation innovation,two of the main activities of this stage were partners selection and conclusion of cooperation agreements.This thesis proposed method of selecting the partners of the Industry-University cooperation innovation based on the fuzzy VIKOR and a case study was performed pointing to the quantification of conflicts between different decision attributes and different types of decision indicators in the selection of partners.Different survey questionnaires were issued for enterprises and universities,and exploratory factor analysis was used to find the factors that affect the agreement between industry and university.The two-party evolutionary game model was built on the basis of these factors to analyze the initial equilibrium formation process of Industry-University cooperation innovation and analyzed the steady state and stable strategy of evolutionary games.The quantification of revenue can make it clear to the participants,this thesis divided the economic revenue into sales economic revenue and transfer economic revenue.It proposed that the option pricing method can be used to quantify the economic revenue of intellectual property transfer in the Industry-University cooperation innovation and then analyzed the feasibility of applying the Contingent Valuation Method to quantify the social revenue of Industry-University cooperation innovation,and put forward the application process of this method.Combining the technical goals of the Industry-University cooperation innovation and the idea of"goal-deviation",it raised the quantification method of multiple knowledge units in the actual context.According to research process of proposing variables and designing questionnaires on literature summary,puting forward hypotheses to build theoretical models,collecting and analyzing questionnaire data,using structural equation models to empirical analyze to find the factors that affect the satisfaction of revenue sharing of Industry-University cooperation innovation.It found that five factors had positive or negative effect to the satisfaction degree,the regulatory effect of supervisory coordination was verified also.Based on the above five factors,combined with the four stages of Industry-University cooperation innovation,a co-evolution dynamic model of revenue sharing was constructed in line with the Lotka-Volterra model,and the tripartite evolutionary game theory was used to build the Industry-University cooperation innovation revenue sharing model with government participation.Through the analysis of the two evolution models,it was found that attention should be paid to the role of adjustment coefficients in different stages,and government should reduce the indirect intervention and adjustment of innovation revenue sharing of Industry-University cooperation innovation,and the participants should improve innovation ability matching degree,increase innovation investment,reduce communication and coordination costs,increase punitive measures to improve the formation of a dynamic sharing mechanism of Industry-University cooperation innovation revenue.Based on the results of empirical research and model research,according to the characteristics of formal contract and relationship contract,this thesis proposed that the combination of the two contracts to design the contract mechanism as the theoretical and application basis of management strategy could solve the problem of dynamic revenue sharing better.In addition,the government played an intermediary and regulatory role directly by setting up platforms,formulating policies,and improving the resource and capacity matching degree of participants,managing the relationship through punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism,identifying knowledge spillover risks and deliberately concealing risks were all effective measures for the dynamic sharing of Industry-University cooperation innovation revenue.
Keywords/Search Tags:Industry-University cooperation, innovation revenue, dynamic sharing, evolutionary game, structural equation model, evolutionary dynamic model
PDF Full Text Request
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