A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study On Accounting Fraud Of Listed Companies Based On The Model Of Replication Dynamic

As an important part of China's economy,listed companies effectively promote national economic and social welfare,and their role cannot be ignored.However,with the development of economy,gradually increased number of listed companies,financial fraud and accounting fraud problems emerge in endlessly,have more and more serious trend,this not only makes the social economy at risk,but also on the confidence of investors,but also to the state laws and regulations of contempt,trampling on the principle of fair,open and fair market,seriously hindered the healthy development of the green national economy.Through the review and analysis of the existing literature,this paper finds that although the researches on corporate fraud are numerous,they generally focus on the behavior motivation,fraud mode and the harm of the results from the perspective of the general,but the game analysis from the multi-related stakeholders is less.Therefore,in this paper,based on stakeholder theory,game theory and information asymmetry science,with the aid of statistical data,analyzes the present situation of accounting fraud of listed companies in our country,and then build a game model,the listed companies,accounting firms and government regulators of dynamic game,stability with evolutionary game analysis,concluded:(1)the accounting fraud of listed companies in our country still exists,further active constraints;(2)in the evolutionary game system,the strategy choice of either party is affected by the strategy choice of the other two parties,but the influence of the government regulatory department's strategy choice is more likely to come from the behavioral decision of listed companies whether to cheat or not;(3)in the three-dimensional system composed of listed companies,accounting firms and government regulatory departments,D(0,0,1)is an evolutionary stability strategy under the condition that the listed companies do not commit fraud,accounting firms strictly audit,and government regulatory departments implement supervision;(4)from the perspective of internal influencing factors of each party in the game,behavior cost is an important factor affecting the behavior of listed companies,accounting firms and government regulatory departments.Based on the analysis results of the full text,this paper puts forward some Suggestions,such as strengthening the three-party contact in the game,ensuring the orderly operation of government supervision,and reducing the operation cost of auditing supervision.