Research On The Interest Coordination Mechanism Among Electronic Commerce Supply Chain Participants

With the development of Internet technology and labor division,Electronic Commerce Supply Chain(ECSC)is an inevitable trend of the era.It is a kind of chain structure,which is comprised of e-commerce enterprises,platform,logistics service provider and consumer.E-commerce enterprises can provide high-quality products to consumer by entering the platform and choosing appropriate logistics service providers.Participants in the ECSC are independent interest subjects making decisions to maximize self-interest,which will form interest conflicts in the ECSC and affect the stability of ECSC.Extant literature has paid limited attention to the questions,lacking a clear and general viewpoint.The scattered conclusions have not been able to form the systematical interest coordination mechanism.Therefore,the thesis studys the interest relationship among participants of the ECSC to resolve the interest conflict.The interest coordination mechanisms are proposed and theoretical guidance is provided for the e-commerce enterprises.The main work and contributions of the dissertation are as follows:First,the third party collective reputation mechanism under the circumstance of bilateral moral hazard between e-commerce enterprise and consumer is investigated.The thesis analyzes the condition of integrity strategy in repeated transaction.The relationship between penalty factor,registration fee and TPTCR revenue commission is verified.The trust mechanism based on the third-party collective reputation(TPTCR)is first introduced into the interests coordination between e-commerce enterprise and consumer.The realization of specific investment is reconsidered.By dividing the transaction subjects into "integrity type" and "opportunism type",It is found that honest traders must register TPTCR mechanism in short-term trading.In addition,the equilibrium conditions for opportunistic traders to register TPTCR mechanism in a long-term transaction is given.Both parties will choose to register TPTCR and maintain the good faith when the penalty and fraud loss rate satisfy some certain conditions.This conclusion extends the relationship between registered deposit and traders' strategy selection to the setting of bilateral moral hazard,and obtains the strategy selection of opportunistic traders in the long-term repetitive trading process.The thesis makes up for the deficiency of existing literature in just identifying the dishonest behavior of e-commerce enterprises through the deposit and reputation mechanism.This mechanism improves the defect of inviting e-commerce enterprises to register with a lower margin and charging no fees to consumer,which makes the default cost of both sides lower and effect of platform signal strategy is not obvious.The mechanism is helpful to maintain the trust relationship between the two sides and create a "win-win" trading environment.Second,in view of the deficiency of traditional literature,which usually separates the evaluation of consumer service quality from the benefit coordination between e-commerce enterprises and logistics service providers.Considering the connection relationship between customer service quality evaluation and value realization of both sides,the customer service quality evaluation is first introduced into the interests coordination between e-commerce enterprise and logistics service provider.The incentive mechanism under fixed output scenario and benefit distribution mechanism under cooperative output scenario between e-commerce enterprise and logistics service provider are established.By extending the traditional principal-agent model to the "fixed output" scenario.The results show that: considering the incentive mechanism of customer service quality evaluation,the allocation ratio of marginal cost and the conversion coefficient become the limiting factors of logistics service providers' efforts.Under the incentive mechanism of customer service quality evaluation,when the output of logistics service quality is less than a fixed value,the efforts of logistics service providers will increase.With the decrease of their marginal cost allocation ratio,e-commerce enterprises need to increase the revenue sharing coefficient and reduce the fixed subsidy to balance the mutual interests.The influence of consumer service quality evaluation on incentive effect is demonstrated as a new research perspective.The above conclusions illustrate the changes in the effort of logistics service providers,fixed subsidies and revenue sharing coefficient of e-commerce enterprises after considering the evaluation of consumer service quality.It provides theoretical support for improving the unobservability of logistics service providers' efforts.In addition,consumer service quality evaluation in segmental task is introduced into the benefit distribution mechanism under cooperative output.The hybrid Kano-DEMATEL method is proposed,which combines the contribution of value factors to consumer satisfaction and the importance of segmental task in the system to identify and quantify the actual contribution of each logistics service provider.Consequently,the problem of "free rider" under cooperative output is avoided.Finally achieve the purpose of improving the overall logistics service output quality and cooperative initiative.Third,the evolution mechanism of the cooperative relationship between e-commerce enterprise and platform from the dynamic perspective is investigated by using the evolutionary game and Logistic model.Network effect is firstly introduced into the evolution model to analyze the optimal cooperation strategy between e-commerce enterprise and platform.The thesis describes the influence of excess return,revenue sharing rate,cooperation cost and default penalty on the evolution path of cooperation from the dynamic perspective.The research show that when the conversion level of network effect is greater than a certain value,the enterprises under the lower level of revenue sharing will choose cooperation strategy.The system eventually evolved into a steady state.It makes up for the deficiency of literature in describing the interest coordination behavior between e-commerce enterprises and platforms from a static perspective.The above conclusion defuses a tense situation that e-commerce enterprises require a higher level of revenue sharing by taking advantage of its size.The balance of interests has been improved.In addition,the evolution mechanism of cooperative relationship is designed in the view of system.The influence coefficient and contribution coefficient of value output in the model are adjusted to analyze the evolutionary strategy in different stages of the mutualism relationship.It deepens the theoretical knowledge about the dynamic change process of the cooperative relationship between e-commerce enterprise and platform.The interest coordination mechanisms between e-commerce enterprises and different participants of e-commerce supply chain are constructed.It is helpful for e-commerce enterprises to establish scientific interest coordination strategy and stable relationship with the other participants.This will eventually improve the profitability of participants in the e-commerce supply chain and survival probability of e-commerce enterprises.