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Coordinating Green Supply Chain With Loss-Aversion Under Government Subsidy

Posted on:2018-12-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y CuiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330536477833Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As people's emphasis on resources and environment,as well as the government's advocate of green living and encouragement,and the concept of green and low carbon has been widely accepted.In the competitive market,in order to response to the call of the government and society needs,green products entered people's daily life,as both economic and environmental benefits of green supply chain participants retailer,began to establish long-term cooperative relationship with suppliers,provide the market with green environmental protection product.As coordinator of market direction,with high visibility and high loyalty customers,retailers seem be more easy to close to the consumers,and obtain the accurate customer demand information,they not only provide unprecedented one-stop shopping opportunities but also provide efficient promotion service supplier,moreover,the government advocates the enterprise research and development of the green environment,more and more suppliers product green products,suppliers are more eager to selling through retailers powerful channel green products,gain guidance information,market demand and green products,reduce the risk of product research and development.Under the background of government subsidies.this thesis researched the coordination and win-win contract mechanism between supply chain members dominated by retailers.Firstly,this thesis discussed the green supply chain based on government subsidies without a contract under the model,analyzed the retailer and supplier in the decentralized supply chain model in the absence of contract,the interests of the supplier and the retailer did not achieve the optimal,there still is room to improve in the expected profit,for improvement of the supply chain,the retailer can set contract mechanism to associated with supplier,.Secondly,in both retailer and supplier is risk neutral scenario,it studied the revenue sharing contract implementation and cost sharing of supply chain coordination problem in the supply chain dominated by retailer,it designed the revenue sharing and cost sharing combination model,and analyzed the decision-making behavior of retailers and suppliers,and revenue sharing contract and cost sharing contract coordinating role.Further,this thesis studied supply chain decision when the supply chain members have the characteristic of loss aversion,It was still in the two levels of green supply chain consisting of a supplier and retailer as the research object,on the basis of green supply chain decision-making game model.the supply chain coordination problem was discussed under retailer with loss aversion properties and supplier with loss aversion properties,analyzed supply chain members with loss aversion,revenue sharing and cost sharing contract could achieve the whole supply chain coordination,and influence of the degree of loss aversion in green degree and the decisions and profits of retailers and suppliers through the model.Finally,this thesis studied the contract parameters on the impact of green supply chain decisions by example analysis.
Keywords/Search Tags:government subsidy, green degree, revenue sharing contract, cost sharing contract, loss aversion
PDF Full Text Request
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