Research On Revenue Sharing Contract In Assembly System And Exploration For Its Risk

With the progress of science and technology,economic globalization is becoming increasingly apparent,the international market and domestic market competition is becoming more intense,enterprises are facing a more strong competitors and more complex competitive environment.Nowadays,the production of any kind of product is not done by a company,but by the cooperation of different enterprises to complete.This series of interrelated,mutual restraint of the enterprise network constitutes a supply chain.Enterprises want to occupy a place in the product market,the supply chain is its most important competitiveness.This paper focuses on the typical case of the supply chain-the supply chain coordination mechanism of the assembly system.An assembly system model was built by an assembler and n suppliers.For suppliers/assemblers in the assembly system,they want to maximize individual interests,but at the same time make the whole supply chain efficiency low.Supply chain coordination mechanism is an attempt to unify the supply chain under its overall objectives,under conditions of limited resources to maximize the overall efficiency of the supply chain.This kind of perfect coordination mechanism is supply chain contract,contract has many forms.This paper mainly discusses the supply chain coordination problem in assembly system based on revenue sharing contract.When the final product is sold,the assembler needs to take a portion of the proceeds to the supplier as revenue share,and the supplier determines the final delivery based on its own cost structure and this revenue share.This process is a Stackelberg type game,the assembler as a leader,has the right to set the sharing factor and adjust the contract according to the appropriate feedback,then the supplier as a follower,according to the contract to adjust own delivery.We find that the assembler has the Pareto optimal contract in the alternative contract set,although it does not necessarily make the supply chain coordinate,but ultimately can make all the participants in the optimal state,and then maximize the total system revenue.In the case of revenue sharing only,we conclude that in the centralized system,the final product delivery is the largest.But in the case of decentralized system,enterprises are difficult to achieve this perfect goal.By comparing the optimal delivery of suppliers in centralized system and decentralized system,we found that the delivery of decentralized system is often lower than the delivery in centralized system,and the supply chain is unable to achieve coordinate.Because of information asymmetry,suppliers when making decisions alone,only consider their own interests to maximize or minimize losses,so a reduction of deliveries of parts,thereby resulting in reduced shipments of the final product.In order to make the supply chain coordinate,this paper has supplemented the revenue sharing contract and added the surplus subsidy factor.That is,for the unsold final product,the assembler has to pay part of revenue to suppliers as compensation---surplus subsidy,and then get the perfect supply chain coordination mechanism---"revenue sharing and surplus subsidy" contract,this contract not only make the supply chain coordinate,but also increases the delivery of the suppliers,even maximize the total revenue of the system.The previous discussion is based on the newsboy model,with the expected profit function to seek the optimal system.From the opposite point of view,maximizing total revenue of the system is also equivalent to minimizing the total loss of the system.Since the delivery of the component supplier are not fully assembled,we assume that there are no unassembled parts in the previous discussion,we ignore this loss,so we construct the loss function from the point of view of the minimum loss in the next article.Analyzes the variance of the suppliers and the assembler,and determines the relationship between them to make the system up to the optimal situation.In conventional literature,suppliers and assemblers are always risk neutral,but in real life and production,based on the supplier's own nature tends to more risk aversion.Therefore,in order to make the model more practical,this paper further explores the optimal delivery of risk-averse suppliers based on CVaR.It is found that the optimal delivery of the supplier depends on the revenue sharing factor and the risk aversion factor,which increases with the increase of the revenue sharing and increases with the increase of the risk aversion coefficient.It is further found that the optimal delivery of the risk aversion supplier is less than the delivery of the risk neutral supplier.