Game Analysis On An Enterprise Technology Licensing Under Demand Information Sharing

In the era of rapid development of innovation economy,technology licensing is an important way to transform innovative technology into practical achievements,and it is a key strategy for enterprises to make business decisions.At the same time,many enterprises have private demand information about products,and there is a phenomenon of demand information asymmetry among the enterprises.In order to achieve a win-win situation,cooperative enterprises share information to make more accurate production and pricing decisions.As a result,the issue of information value has attracted widespread attention from the academia community and the industry.However,we find the existing research on the impact of demand information sharing about the technology licensing decisions of innovation enterprises are still very few.Therefore,this dissertation focuses on the impacts of the information sharing on enterprises' technology licensing strategies,and has important theoretical value and practical guiding significance.Firstly,this dissertation explores the impacts of demand information sharing on technology licensing and production decision-making among enterprises.With the advent of the Internet age,not only the traditional retailers,but also the sales platforms and the third-party platforms are equipped with a large amount of the private demand information about products,and they also consider that whether to share private demand information to cooperative enterprises or not.Based on the theory of information economics and technological innovation management,this section constructs a research framework,which analyzes the production decision-making and the technology licensing game of the innovation and the licensee with no permission,fixed fee licensing and unit production royalty licensing respectively,influenced by the demand information sharing of a sales platform and a third party platform(or share a manufacturer or share two manufacturers at the same time)and a retailer,to clarify the structure of the dissertation.Secondly,this dissertation characterizes game models of an outside innovator,a licensee and a retailer when a retailer shares demand information,and analyzes production decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer and the technology licensing game between an outside innovator and the manufacturer with the influence of the retailer's demand information sharing.The results show that,when the retailer's private demand forecast value is positive,the manufacturer's wholesale price is higher and the retailer's order quantity is higher when the information sharing happens.The higher the retailer's private demand forecast accuracy is,the higher the profits of the retailer and the manufacturer are,and the fixed license fee,the royalty license fee and the outside innovator's profits remain unchanged.When the retailer shares private demand information,his own profits decrease,but the profits of manufacturer increase.With or without demand information sharing by the retailer,the optimal wholesale price is lowest,and the order quantity is largest,and the profits of the outside innovator and the retailer are largest under fixed fee licensing.Thirdly,this dissertation studies the technology licensing game between an incumbent innovator and a licensee when the demand information is shared by a sales platform.The results demonstrate that,when the sales platform's private demand forecast value is positive,the incumbent innovator's(the licensee's)production quantity is largest when the sales platform only shares the private demand information to the incumbent innovative innovator(the licensee).The optimal production quantity is larger when the sales platform sharing her private demand information to both the incumbent innovator and the manufacturer than the information sharing strategy does not happen.As for the licensing fee of the incumbent innovator,both the fixed fee and the royalty license fee always are higher when the sharing strategy occurs.The higher the sales platform's private demand forecast accuracy is,the higher the profits of the retailer and the manufacturer are.With no licensing strategy or fixed fee licensing strategy,the incumbent innovator(the licensee)gets larger profits when the sales platform shares her private demand information.And the sales platform can also benefit from her sharing behaviors.Under the unit production royalty licensing strategy,the demand information sharing modes don't damage each enterprise's expected profits.Moreover,numerical experiments show that,no matter which sharing mode the incumbent innovator is faced with,the optimal technology licensing strategy largely depends on the product competition coefficient.When the product competition coefficient is less than a certain threshold,the fixed fee licensing is optimal for the incumbent innovator.Otherwise,the unit production royalty licensing defeats the fixed fee licensing.Finally,this dissertation also explores the technology licensing game between the enterprises when the demand information is shared with an information fee by a third-party platform,and analyzes the value and the effect on the innovator's profits of the information.The results show that,it is beneficial for the third-party sharing his private demand information to both the incumbent innovator and the manufacturer,or to only the incumbent innovator.The third-party's information sharing fee and optimal profits remain unchanged under non-technology licensing strategy and fixed fee licensing strategy.Under unit production royalty licensing strategy,the information fee of the third-party platform is related to the competition coefficient of the product and the mode of information sharing.When the third-party's private demand forecast value is positive and the sharing occurs,the optimal production quantity and fixed fee are larger under non-licensing strategy and fixed fee licensing strategy.Under the unit production royalty licensing strategy,when sharing occurs,the optimal production quantity and the optimal licensing fee are not lower than the case that the third-party refuses sharing the demand information.Moreover,the numerical experiments demonstrate that the incumbent innovator's optimal profits are highest under the unit production royalty licensing strategy,and lowest under non-licensing strategy,when the competition coefficient of products is larger.