The Effect Of Specificity Capital Inputs To Loan Contracting Behavior ——Based On Sci-tech Finance

Since China's comprehensive innovation and reform experiment was launched in 2015,the Bank-VC(venture capital)cooperation experiment of financial service to enterprise innovation has been the highlight of Science and Technology(Sci-tech)Finance.In 2020,the State Council of China announced a new batch of Sci-tech Finance achievements,which prompted new changes to take place in the experiment of Bank-VC cooperation.All of them beg the questions as follows: Can these changes effectively reduce the transaction cost of the institution?Are there rules to follow in the innovation of financial service to enterprises? How to optimize the Sci-tech Financial Institutions in accordance with rules? A rational discussion of these problems can help deepen the current innovation experiment in the Experimental Zone,and also provide a theoretical reference for realizing the integration of "industrial chain,innovation chain and capital chain" proposed by the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,and for realizing“establishing an industrial system of coordinated development of real economy,Sci-tech innovation,modern finance and human resources" proposed by the 19 th National Congress of the CPC.Literature review shows that due to the confidentiality of the data of loan contracts and the "rational person" paradigms,few theoretical results are found concerning systematic exploration of the above issues.Guided the "contractual person" paradigms of new institutionalism theory,the purpose of optimizing the Sci-tech Finance institution is to save transaction costs.Transaction cost economics believes that only when contract selection and contract governance match each other could transaction costs be saved.Therefore,combined with China's existing loan extending regulations and the pilot of Bank-VC cooperation,the above problems can be divided into the following two sub-problems around loan contract selection and contract governance:(1)Which is more suitable for enterprise innovation,"investment"(equity financing)or "loan"(debt financing)?(2)Which contract governance mechanism is more suitable for enterprise innovation,relational contracting or classical contracting?On the basis of discussing the common problems of contract selection and contract governance,this dissertation investigates the heterogeneity of high-tech enterprises,and,through comparative institutional analysis,provides theoretical reference for the development of the sci-tech finance of the new era in our country..This dissertation consists of seven chapters.Chapter 1 is the introduction,which introduces the background of the topic,research significance,research logic and methods,dissertation structure and contents,innovations.Chapter 2 presents a review of the research,which defines the important concepts,and reviews the literatures of specificity capital in terms of material specificity and relationship specificity.This dissertation critiques and evaluates the research on Sci-tech Finance from the perspective of financing sources of enterprise innovation — debt financing,equity financing and government funding.It is found that although these financing sources have heterogeneous effects on innovation output,they all help to release the financing constraints of enterprise innovation,which serves as the premise of the research theme into which my dissertation will conduct a deeper exploration.Chapter 3 elucidates the analysis of the institution background and theoretical basis,introduces the development of Sci-tech Finance in China,and makes a special investigation on the Bank-VC cooperation institution.Closely related to the research topic,the dissertation gives the theoretical basis,and makes a preliminary analysis of the two sub-problems,which provides the necessary institutional background and theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis.It is found that since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11 th CPC Central Committee governments have led the gradual institutional change of Sci-tech Finance,and banks have always been the core secondary actors.The relationship financing under Bank-VC cooperation is the development direction of Sci-tech Finance.Chapters4,5 and 6 respectively test the effect of different specificity capital inputs to loan contracting behavior,empirically exmine the regularity and heterogeneity of Sci-tech Finance in development.Based on China's "Contract Law" and "General Principles of Loans" and other loan institutions,this dissertation selects the first-hand loan transaction records from "Experimental Zone",and vertically addresses the above two sub-problems from three contracting levels: enterprise financing contracts selection,bank loan credit certification,and contracts governance.It is found that:(1)there is a positive correlation between specificity capital investment and enterprises' choice of equity contract financing;(2)there is a negative correlation between material specificity inputs and bank credit certification;(3)specificity capital inputs transmits relational contracting signal;(4)By further selecting the samples of Sci-tech enterprise financing,the section offers micro supportive evidence to the finding of the homogeneity of the above-mentioned sci-tech enterprise financing.The impirical research in this dissertation provides a clearer theoretical reference to the Bank-VC cooperative services to enterprise innovation in selection of contracts and contract governance.Chapter 7 draws the conclusion to the dissertation.This chapter summarizes the main conclusions and policy implications,and points out the shortcomings and future improvement direction of the dissertation.The possible innovations of this dissertation are as follows:(1)The topic is original as the dissertation focuses on the frontier policy hot spots of Sci-tech Finance in China's comprehensive innovation and reform experiment.Taking the optimization of Bank-VC cooperation institution as the research object,and focusing on the micro motivation of the optimization of Sci-tech Finance institution,this dissertation makes a theoretical and empirical exploration into the institutional proposition of Bank-VC cooperation service to enterprise innovation.Based on the above empirical results and the comparative institutional analysis of the TCT,there are new findings,and combined with the optimization of the Bank-VC cooperation institution,a new view of partnetship organizational innovation is extracted.(2)The micro institutional research paradigm and theoretical analysis are innovative.This dissertation integrates the micro transaction analysis paradigm of Transaction Cost Theory(TCT)into the localized Relational Contract Theory(RCT),and preliminarily clarifies the micro mechanism of specificity capital(material capital ? social capital)inputs affecting Sci-tech Finance.Based on the micro loan records,this dissertation empirically tests the theoretical mechanism.From the perspective of two-way factor trading of“contractual person”,it expands the limitation of unilateral “rational person” in traditional financing theory,and makes a beneficial attempt for the localization of new institutional theory and its service to China's Sci-tech Finance development.(3)The data,variables and logic of argument used in empirical analysis are innovative.The selected nearly 100,000 loan transactions,of which the data are rare in the related academic cirlce,are from the comprehensive innovation and reform pilot zone in China,and the variable setting is highly consistent with the research theme.Based on the theoretical analysis framework of new institutionalism,this dissertation demonstrates the research theme from the horizontal and vertical aspects.The logic of argument is more rigorous.TE estimation,IV estimation and PSM estimation are used to test the robustness and heterogeneity of the empirical results.The main results can be verified vertically and horizontally.