Research On The Impact Of Information Disclosure On Institutional Investors Holding Behavior

With the continuous development of institutional investors in China, more and more important in the capital market investment main body. Status and competitive strengthen professional investors, institutional investors gradually changed the investment strategy:from the passive strategy of "vote with their feet" into active "vote by hand" strategy; From "keep distance" type to "pilot" type; From blind investment to focus investment; Never pay attention to information screened into active analysis information disclosure; From shareholder passivism to shareholder activism. This requires that institutional investors are increasingly demanding in the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, in order to expand more scientific and reasonable investment, more institutional investors begin to pay close attention to and actively affect the problem of information disclosure of listed companies. At the same time, through the research of the listed company information disclosure quality influence on the behavior of institutional investors holding, beneficial to the improvement of the pay attention to the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, to attract institutional investors to invest.Based on the 2009-2013 in Shenzhen stock exchange main board listed companies as research samples, the disclosure of information by the Shenzhen stock exchange with assessment results to measure quality of information disclosure, to institutional ownership on behalf of institutional investors holding behavior, the empirical analysis of the information disclosure quality on the influence of institutional investors holding behavior, and the rise and fall of the quality of information disclosure on the influence of institutional investors holding change, at the same time on two different groups of institutional investors to analyze the sensitivity of the institutional investors on the company’s information disclosure quality change, finally, using the audit opinion, disclosure days, stop resumption and penalty number and annual report restatement as alternative vector of information disclosure quality requirements, examining the impact on the overall shareholding institutional investor behavior.The empirical analysis found that institutional investors holding proportion (current) and information disclosure quality has significant positive correlation. The higher the corporate disclosure quality, institutional investors holding ratio is, the higher (float). Changes in institutional ownership proportion (current) and information disclosure quality has significant negative correlation, but the institutional investor shareholding proportion (current) change positively related to the disclosure rating rise, was not significant. Compared with institutions lower shareholding company, high institutional ownership of company ownership change is more sensitive to changes in corporate disclosure quality. High institutional ownership group of changes in the ownership is negatively related to the disclosure rating decreased significantly, and related to information disclosure rating rise was not significant; Institutional ownership proportion low group shareholding change on information disclosure rating rise significantly higher than that of the significance of information disclosure ratings downgrades. Compared with domestic institutional investors, foreign institutional investors holding rate of change is more sensitive to changes in corporate disclosure quality. Institutional investor shareholding proportion (current) and the audit opinion is significantly related to the significant negative correlation with the number stop resumption.