Research On The Impact Of The Transformation Of State-Owned Assets Supervision System On The Innovation Efficiency Of State-Owned Enterprises

The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward “cultivating world-class enterprises with global competitiveness”.Under the basic economic system with public ownership as the mainstay,state-owned enterprises,as an organizational form that embodies the will of the whole people,should further release their innovative potential through reforms and walk in the forefront of building a world-class enterprise.However,under the state-owned assets supervision system that focuses on asset management,the political costs associated with government intervention and the lack of internal governance mechanisms often lead to the lack of motivation,lack of willingness,and insufficient investment in state-owned enterprises in their innovative behaviors.The problem restricts the improvement of the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises.In order to further promote the separation of government and capital,the separation of government and enterprises,and to improve the operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises,since the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council have repeatedly proposed to promote the transformation of the functions of state-owned assets regulatory agencies with capital management as the mainstay.State-owned assets supervision system based on capital management.Therefore,how to use the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system to break through the innovation bottleneck of state-owned enterprises and promote the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises while promoting the high-quality development of China's economy has become a major issue that needs to be solved urgently.On the basis of previous research,this article first sorts out the evolution of the state-owned assets regulatory system,and analyzes the internal logic of the state-owned assets regulatory system's transition from asset management to capital management and the core move of the state-owned assets regulatory system's transition.Secondly,based on the existing theory,this article not only analyzes the direct mechanism of the stateowned assets supervision system influencing the innovation of state-owned enterprises,but also analyzes that the state-owned assets supervision system can optimize corporate innovation decision-making behaviors and reduce policy burdens to increase corporate innovation resources by improving corporate governance.The indirect mechanism of input behavior and mitigation of executive compensation control to enhance the willingness to innovate and proactive behavior on the innovation efficiency of stateowned enterprises.Then,since studying the impact of the transformation of the stateowned assets supervision system on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises requires accurate measurement of the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,this article introduces the main methods of measuring the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and conducts a survey of the state-owned enterprises' innovation efficiency status in terms of regions and industries.analyze.Thirdly,this paper uses the methods of propensity matching-double difference(PSMDID),mediating effect model,system GMM model and panel fixed effect model to test the influence of state-owned assets regulatory system policy changes on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and the mediating mechanism.Finally,considering the mixed ownership reform as the realization form of the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system,this paper further empirically analyzes the impact of the changes in the ownership structure based on the mixed ownership reform on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,and gives the main conclusions and policy recommendations of this paper.The main research conclusions of this paper are: First,the overall innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of private enterprises,but the gap is not obvious.Moreover,since 2015,the growth rate of innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises has accelerated,which also means that after the state-owned assets supervision system has shifted to a capital-based management system,the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises has been significantly improved.Second,whether the DEA method is used to measure the enterprise innovation efficiency or the enterprise innovation efficiency measured by the SFA method as the explained variable,the estimated coefficient of the transformation of the state-owned assets supervision system is significantly positive.Moreover,after controlling the endogenous problems and using various methods to test the robustness of this article,the estimated coefficient of the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system is still significantly positive,indicating that the empirical research results are reliable.Has a promoting effect.Third,in addition to directly promoting the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,the transformation of the state-owned regulatory system can also indirectly affect the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises through three ways of influencing enterprise innovation decision-making behavior,enterprise innovation resource input behavior,and innovation willingness and initiative behavior.Fourth,the impact of macro policy changes in the state-owned assets supervision system on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises is also affected by enterprise heterogeneity factors such as enterprise type,enterprise administrative level,and regional reform process.Fifth,this article uses the equity changes in the process of mixed ownership reform as the proxy indicator to measure the micro-realization of the state-owned assets regulatory system transformation.The results show that the degree of equity integration not only has a direct effect on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,but also can reduce agency costs and reduce The policy burden and mitigation of executive compensation control indirectly affect the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises.The innovations of this article are as follows: First,theoretically,based on China's state-owned assets regulatory system and the reality of the reform and development of state-owned enterprises,this article puts forward "Institutional InnovationEnterprise Innovation Behavior-Enterprise Innovation Efficiency",which is in line with the innovation efficiency decision mechanism of state-owned enterprises.Theoretical hypotheses enrich the theoretical research on the impact of institutional innovation on the innovation performance of micro-enterprises,and provide new ideas for optimizing the innovation decision-making and innovation behavior of enterprises,especially state-owned enterprises,through institutional innovation in practice,thereby promoting the efficiency of enterprise technological innovation.Second,in terms of research content,this article not only analyzes the effects of changes in the state-owned assets regulatory system and policy changes on the innovation efficiency of stateowned enterprises and its intermediary mechanism from the two dimensions of macro policy changes and micro realization forms,but also studies the effects of corporate heterogeneity on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises.The results of the research have had an impact,enriching the content system that the transformation of the state-owned assets supervision system affects the innovation efficiency of stateowned enterprises.Third,in terms of research methods,the existing literature concerning the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system is basically based on qualitative analysis.This article attempts to adopt a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis to study the impact of the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system on the innovation efficiency of enterprises.On the basis of theoretical research,this article conducts empirical research from two dimensions: On the one hand,in terms of macro policy changes,this article regards the transformation of state-owned assets supervision system policy as a "quasi-natural experiment",and uses the PSM-DID model to study state-owned assets supervision The impact of system macro policy changes on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises;on the other hand,in terms of the dimensions of micro realization form dimensions,this paper uses the equity changes after the mixed reform as a micro-level agent to reflect the transformation of the state-owned asset supervision system to the capital-based management system.Variables to analyze the impact of changes in the ownership of mixed-reformed enterprises on the innovation efficiency of enterprises.Fourth,in terms of research viewpoints,this article innovatively proposes that mixed ownership reform is the basic form and means of realizing the transformation of the state-owned assets regulatory system.By introducing the reform of diversification of non-stateowned shareholders' real equity,non-state-owned shareholders in mixed-reformed enterprises whose goal is to pursue economic benefits will actively seek to participate in corporate governance to protect their own rights and interests,and will also form effective checks and balances on state-owned shareholders.Moreover,with the increase in the proportion of non-state shareholders in the total equity of the enterprise,this kind of checks and balances will become more obvious,which will prompt the state-owned regulatory agencies to use capital as a link to exercise shareholder rights through a corporate governance structure.Therefore,this article proposes that mixed ownership reform is the basic form and means of realizing the transformation of the state-owned assets supervision system.