Study On The Impact Of Mixed Ownership And Executive Incentive On The Efficiency Of State-owned Assets

As an important part of the market economy in China,the reform of state-owned enterprises has been attracting the attention of all aspects.And the presence of the mixed ownership reform is not only the requirement of market economy,but also the path of the reform and development of state-owned enterprises.At the third plenary session of the 18^th CPC central committee,the mixed ownership reform has entered into the phase of comprehensively deepen reform.At the same time,the low efficiency problem of state-owned assets is increasingly exposed,in order to solve the problem and improve the efficiency of state-owned assets,the government and state-owned enterprises began to put more energy on the efficiency of the state-owned assets.Mixed ownership reform can improve the efficiency of the assets of state-owned enterprises,and the efficiency of executive incentive is also can stimulus the positive behavior of the executives,and have a positive impact on the efficiency of state-owned assets.However,the state-owned enterprise universal existence the phenomenon such as loss of and low efficiency state-owned assets,causes the market competitiveness of state-owned enterprises is weaker.The loss of state-owned assets and the low efficiency of state-owned assets is not only restricting the development of market economy,but also testing the mixed ownership reform.Thus,the executive incentive and the efficiency of the state-owned assets is also becoming more important.Therefore,the paper is using dates of China's companies from 2013 to 2016 as samples.The purpose is to test the interaction between the mixed ownership and executive incentive on the efficiency of state-owned assets.The results will help state-owned enterprises'internal and external stakeholders to deepen the understanding of the mixed ownership and the efficiency of state-owned assets.Besides,it can improve the advice for the development of the mixed ownership.This article is divided into five chapters.The first chapter puts forward the research background and significance,presents research methods,states research content,builds research framework.The second chapter sums up current research of domestic and foreign,and points out shortcomings and the focus of the study.The third chapter carry out theoretically analysis and put forward the corresponding assumptions.The fourth chapter chooses the appropriate variable,build a research model.The fifth chapter analysis of the empirical results,come to the conclusion and give to the policy advice.The empirical results show that:?1?The diversity of the mixed ownership is not obvious effect on the efficiency of state-owned assets.But the depth and balance of the mixed ownership are able to promote the efficiency of state-owned assets.?2?The salary incentive is obvious negative effect on the efficiency of state-owned assets.On the contrary,the equity incentive can improve the efficiency of state-owned assets.?3?Between the mixed ownership and executive incentive,there is a substitution effect.When the mixed ownership is as a measure of the diversity of the mixed ownership,the diversity of the mixed ownership with salary incentive or equity incentive can not obvious effect on the efficiency of state-owned assets;When the mixed ownership is as a measure of the depth of the mixed ownership,a substitutive effect is found to exist between the depth of the mixed ownership and equity incentive but not between the the mixed ownership and salary incentive.So the positive effect between the depth of the mixed ownership and equity incentive will decrease with the increasing of the number of non-public shareholders;When the mixed ownership is as a measure of the balance of the mixed ownership,a substitutive effect is found to exist between the balance of the mixed ownership and equity incentive but not between the the mixed ownership and salary incentive.So the positive effect between the balance of the mixed ownership and equity incentive will decrease with the increasing of the shareholding ratio of non-public shareholders.According to the conclusions of this paper,with the increase of non-state shareholders ownership,the state-owned assets efficiency promotes significantly.The mixed ownership reform cannot only catch the diversity of equity,should consider the quality.And the short of salary incentive is not able to stimulate executives to improve the efficiency of the state-owned assets,but executives equity incentive to motivate executives'human capital investment,and improve the efficiency of state-owned assets.With the deepening of the mixed ownership reform,the quantity of non-public shareholders or the increase of non-public shareholders holding,the effect of equity incentive on the efficiency of the state-owned assets is weakened.Innovations of this paper are as follows:Firstly,this paper focuses on the theoretical and empirical combined two hot issues:the mixed ownership and the efficiency of state-owned assets.Secondly,the existing study of mixed ownership is not enough for system and perfect,especially the lack of empirical research,makes the study lack of the support of quantitative analysis and data.The paper,build an empirical model,analyzed the influence of the mixed ownership on the efficiency of state-owned assets.Thirdly,considering the particularity of the executives of corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises,the paper further study on the impact of mixed ownership and executive incentive on the efficiency of state-owned assets,and the interaction of both on the efficiency of state-owned assets.The results will be better to understand and interpret the mixed ownership reform bring positive or negative impact of state-owned enterprises and state-owned assets.