The Influence Of Non-state-owned Shareholders On The Company’s Illegal Behavior Under The Mixed System Reform Of State-owned Enterprises

Mixed ownership reform is an important trend and direction of SOE reform,and the effectiveness of the reform has been widely discussed and researched in academic circles.This paper explores the effect of SOE mixed ownership reform on corporate irregularities based on the perspective of corporate irregularities.This paper uses the data of state-owned listed companies in A-shares from 2008-2019 and hand-collected non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholdings in state-owned listed companies This paper uses the data of A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008-2019 and manually collected data of non-state shareholders’shareholdings and personnel assignments of state-owned listed companies to study the effect of non-state shareholders’ participation in governance on corporate irregularities from two dimensions of equity integration and governance structure,and further analyzes the moderating effect of industry competition degree on the above effect and the mediating effect of internal control mechanism on the above effect.The results show that the increase of non-state shareholders’ shareholding has no significant effect on corporate irregularities,and only when non-state shareholders actively participate in the business governance of SOEs by appointing directors does it have a significant inhibitory effect on corporate irregularities.The participation of non-state shareholders in corporate governance has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate irregularities in SOEs in competitive industries,but has no significant effect on SOEs in monopolistic industries.Moreover,this study finds that the participation of non-state shareholders in corporate governance reduces corporate irregularities by improving the internal control mechanism of the firm.Further,it is found that non-state shareholders’ participation in corporate governance has a more significant effect on the governance of information disclosure violations and operational violations compared to leadership violations and general violations.Finally,this paper makes relevant suggestions on how to better manage corporate violations in state-owned enterprises.