| We are at the cusp of a transition of our domestic electricity market towards a continuously liberalized competitive wholesale electricity market.The first batch of electricity spot markets represented by Guangdong Province has started pilot projects since the end of 2018.In the competitive wholesale electricity market,market participants with strategic bidding usually exercise market power through strategic behaviors of economic retention or physical retention based on the principle of profit maximization.Although the original intention of the introduction of a competitive electricity market is to improve market efficiency,an oligopolistic competitive electricity market with market power will inevitably lead to efficiency losses,and the resulting market power problems often determine the success or failure of market operations.Therefore,the strategic behaviors and market power of market participants are the hotspots of current electricity market operations and scholars around the world.Market power mitigation mechanism with different market environment of the generator’s electricity market,the DR market are studied.Firstly,the behavior of market participants and the overall efficiency of the market from the perspectives of the generators market and the user demand response market are studied,and further two zero loss market power mitigation mechanisms applicable to generators and DR respectively are proposed.Based on the simplified model above,the complex market with multiple constraints and uncertainty of DR is further considered.With the design of different environmental equilibrium solving algorithms,the effect of the proposed mitigation mechanism and the mature mitigation mechanism of the market is compared in the complex market,to guarantee the effectiveness of the proposed market power mitigation mechanism in a theoretical and simulation way.This thesis is designed to provide reference value from the market supervision perspective to efficient electricity market mechanism design.The main contributions of this thesis are1.The strategic bidding behavior on the generation side and the user side is studied,and the efficiency loss caused by market power is analyzed.As for the equilibrium model between the system operator and generators bids based on the affine function of the marginal cost on the generation side,the equivalent centralized convex optimization model of equilibria is given,which verifies the market efficiency loss of strategic bidding under the general bidding form.Similarly,for the user-side DR bidding model,we show that there is market efficiency loss in DR strategic bidding with consumer psychology models.Then based on representative market participation,three dimensions of market power evaluation indicators and the overall order indicator of the market are designed as the basic framework for measuring market efficiency in this thesis.Simulation results verify the correctness of the theoretical analysis for the bidding behavior of generators and DRs and the possible market efficiency loss of the strategic bidding.2.Based on the analysis of the competitive behavior of generators,a mitigation mechanism for generation market power that can lead the Nash equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium is designed.For the linear supply function bidding model of generators,an effective market power mitigation mechanism is proposed and rigorously deduced.Simulation results prove that the proposed mechanism can perfectly guide the strategic generators from the stable fluctuation of Nash equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium.Theoretical certification and simulation analysis verifies the characteristics of the mechanism to meet the incentive compatibility,booting the bidding wishes,increasing the market efficiency,and maximizing the balance of payments.The rationality of the mechanism and its effectiveness on the simplified model are verified.3.Based on the analysis of the competitive behavior of DR users,a market power mitigation mechanism for the DR side that can guide the Nash equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium is designed.For the DR bidding model based on the consumer psychology supply function,the market power mitigation mechanism applied to DR strategic bidding is proposed and strictly derived.Simulation results prove that the proposed mechanism can perfectly guide the strategic DR from the stable fluctuation of Nash equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium.Theoretical certification and simulation analysis verifies the characteristics of the mechanism to meet the incentive compatibility,reducing the suppression response,increasing the market efficiency,and maximizing the balance of payments.The rationality of the mechanism and its effectiveness on the simplified model are verified.4.The above-proposed generation market power mitigation mechanism in the complex market models that consider multiple physical constraints is studied.Expanding the simplified model to the complex model with the smallest,maximum technical force constraint,network blocking constraints,we propose MAS-based genetic-internal algorithm applicable to solving complex model equalization analysis.We then established three mature market mitigation mechanism models that consider the introduction of the futures market beforehand,price substitution,and ex-post punishment.Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the generation market power mitigation mechanism designed in this thesis under the complex model,which is better than other mature mechanisms.5.The above-proposed DR market power mitigation mechanism in the complex market models that considers the uncertainty of DR response is studied.Expanding the simplified model to the complex model with DR response uncertainty,we combined with random optimization and MAS-based genetic-intrinsic algorithm to solve the equilibrium problem.Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the DR market power mitigation mechanism designed in this thesis under the complex model,which is better than mature mechanisms. |
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