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Research On Long-term Game Analysis Method Of Hydropower Market Based On Nash Equilibrium

Posted on:2020-07-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S M LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330590496993Subject:Hydrology and water resources
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In recent years,the cascade hydropower stations in China have developed rapidly,and gradually form the 14 th hydropower bases,which has promoted the sustainable development of China's energy in an orderly manner.As China continues to accelerate the pace of power system reform,cascades actively participate in the power market,and power marketization is an inevitable trend.The agent of power generation needs to formulate dispatching rules according to the rules of the electricity market and the characteristics of hydropower stations,so that hydropower stations can exert more benefits.Given the current and future price of electricity,the operation rules are usually used to guide the operation of the hydropower stations.However,for large-scale hydropower stations that can affect market electricity prices,the model of power generation maximization is transformed into a game model.The final result of the game is that Nash equilibrium is reached among hydropower stations.At this time,each hydropower station will not change its own operation rules.This paper is at the background of the three cascade hydropower stations in the southwestern basin of China: Hongshui River,Lancang River and Wujiang cascade hydropower stations.The research on long-term game analysis method of hydropower market based on Nash equilibrium is carried out,including research on dynamic programming game model of hydropower station,research on scheduling rules of cascade hydropower stations and game model research of cascade hydropower stations.The results are as follows:(1)In the hydropower electricity market,a dynamic programming game model of hydropower stations is established.Research on three hydropower stations with different power generation bodies: Longtan,Xiaowan and Goupitan.First,the maximum power generation model is established for three hydropower stations,and the obtained solution is taken as the initial scheduling rule.Then,the long-term game model of three hydropower stations is established,the objective function of the model is power generation maximization and solved by dynamic programming algorithm.The model solution results show that the dynamic programming game model of hydropower station significantly improves the efficiency of hydropower station than the model of power generation maximization.(2)In the market competition environment,the game model of cascade hydropower stations is established.For cascade hydropower stations,the principle of energy storage based scheduling and output allocation are adopted as the scheduling rules.The declared power of the cascade hydropower station is determined by the energy storage-based dispatch map,and the declared power of the cascade hydropower station is allocated to each hydropower station through a simplified Sheer rule,and the dispatching rules of each hydropower station are obtained.In this paper,linear,quadratic and cubic rules are used for optimization.The results show that the three scheduling rules are very close,which can well guide the operation of cascade hydropower stations.In this paper,a continuous low-dimensional search algorithm is used to solve the model.In the process of algorithm optimization,only one parameter of the scheduling rule is optimized at each step.The research results include the influence of different scheduling rule curves on the model and the potential impact of the power market on the cascade hydropower station dispatching.For the cascade hydropower stations studied,the game model has a significant increase in revenue compared to the largest model of power generation.Finally,the research contents and results of the full text are summarized,and the problems and deficiencies that need further consideration are prospected.
Keywords/Search Tags:Hydropower Market, Long-term Optimal Operation, Game Model, Nash Equilibrium
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