| Population structure has always been a key factor affecting the medium-and longterm development of the economy and society,as well as the core force affecting the financial sustainability of the pension system.Since entering the aging society in 2000,the proportion of the population aged 65 and over in China has expanded rapidly at twice the world’s average annual growth rate.By 2019,the proportion has increased to11.5%.As a result,the system dependency rate of China’s pension insurance has been continuously improving.Specifically,the system dependency rate of the pension insurance system has risen from 0.317 to 0.392 in just 7 years from 2011 to 2018,which means that there are about 3.15 working people who pay contributions for a retiree,and now there are only 2.55 working people who pay contributions for a retiree.Therefore,it is urgent to push forward a series of reform measures that can offset the pressure of aging.Under the premise that the basic pension insurance system tends to be fixed,parametric reform will become the main policy focus,among which the most popular parametric reform is to delay the retirement age.The main purpose of delaying retirement age is to control the moral hazard of early retirement caused by the increasing pension benefits in the process of retirement decision-making.Starting from the background of population aging,this paper takes delayed retirement reform as an example to analyze the causes of moral hazard in the field of retirement in detail and explain the nature of moral hazard.Then,on the basis of introducing Weitzman’s "quantity-price intervention theory"(Weitzman,1974)into the process of retirement moral hazard governance,this paper deeply explores the optimal moral hazard intervention strategy in delaying retirement in the aging process,which enriches the theoretical foundation of moral hazard governance theory.Finally,on the basis of integrating the ideas of quantity intervention and price intervention,this paper attempts to construct the modules of the “channel” retirement system in China and the characteristic design of each module in moral hazard avoidance,so as to provide necessary decision-making suggestions for the deepening reform of the retirement system during the aging process in China.The contents and conclusion of research are as follows:Firstly,this paper briefly introduces some key concepts and related theories used in the research process of this paper,and sorts out the research progress of the existing research in the related research progress,such as the practice of pension insurance reform,moral hazard intervention,the impact of delaying retirement age,flexible channel retirement policy and so on,which lay a foundation for the following writing of this paper.Secondly,the paper constructs the theoretical framework of the generation of retirement moral hazard in the context of population aging.On the basis of some important typical facts in the practice of pension insurance reform in China,starting from the two basic productivity factors which are population quantity and population quality,taking the theory of intergenerational equity as the core and drawing on KUJ’s idea(Keeping Up with Joneses),the theoretical framework of the generation of retirement moral hazard in China is constructed.And based on the parameter selection of China’s reality,the numerical simulation shows the demand for intergenerational equity of the masses has a shaping effect on various important parameters(including contribution rate,labor participation rate and pre-retirement wage replacement rate)in China’s pension insurance system.The numerical simulation is used mainly to test the explanatory power and applicability of the theoretical framework of "intergenerational equity" generated in the generation of retirement moral hazard.Results show that the“intergenerational equity” theoretical framework of the generation of retirement moral hazard has great explanatory power for the moral hazard of early retirement caused by the increasing pension benefits year by year in China.Thirdly,this paper analyzes and explores the optimal strategies for the intervention of retirement moral hazard in the context of different population aging.On the basis of clarifying the root causes of retirement moral hazard,this paper reduces it to a standard externality problem and constructs a standard Baily-Chetty theoretical framework for retirement decision-making.Based on Weitzman’s external intervention theory,this paper introduces the ideas of quantitative intervention and price intervention in the intervention process of retirement moral hazard,and creatively puts forward quantitative intervention strategies and price intervention strategies for postponing retirement.Then,this paper through the method of numerical simulation explores the relative advantages and disadvantages of quantitative intervention tools and price intervention tools for postponing retirement under incomplete information in different aging processes and their policy effects on individual labor and social welfare.Results show that when there is no uncertainty and heterogeneity,the quantitative regulation characterized by the direct regulation of retirement age is equivalent to the price regulation characterized by strengthening the relationship between contribution and benefit.As the uncertainty and heterogeneity are introduced,the numerical simulation shows that the existing price regulation is still far less than the optimal level and should be further strengthen as the change of economic growth and population structure.The higher the individual heterogeneity,the greater the advantage of price regulation compared with quantity regulation.However,price interventions are not always superior to quantitative interventions.When considering the second type of information gap,it is necessary to switch to direct quantitative interventions if the sum of wage growth and population growth falls another 25% from the current level(from 4.25 to3.2).Fourth,this paper constructs the theoretical framework of the moral hazard avoidance design scheme of China’s retirement system.In this paper,based on the integration of Weitzman’s quantitative intervention and price intervention,the quantitative intervention strategy of postponing retirement and price intervention strategy of postponing retirement are mixed to design the moral hazard avoidance scheme in China’s retirement system.Based on the "push-pull" theory of floating population,the "push-pull" design scheme for China’s retirement is proposed.Then,the theoretical model of the "push-pull" design scheme is constructed respectively under the homogeneous and heterogeneous conditions.Finally,the theoretical model is completely identified through the actual data and situation in China.The policy effect of the setting of policy parameters and their possible combinations on individual labor force and social welfare in the design scheme of "push-pull" for delayed retirement is simulated and analyzed,and the rational system idea of China’s "channel" retirement system and the optimization direction of the reform of policy parameters in the "pushpull" design module are conceived,which are helpful to conceive the rational design of China’s "channel" retirement system as well as optimization direction of system parameter reform in "push-pull" design module.Results show that:(1)as far as the replacement rate of delayed retirement benefits is concerned,although its impact on social welfare is "inverted U-shaped",its inflection point appears only when the replacement rate of delayed retirement benefits is very high.In reality,this inflection point cannot be reached.Therefore,as for the replacement rate of the parameter of delayed retirement benefits,we should try our best to improve their benefits to ensure that the retirement system of our country can form a strong "pull" of late retirement,so as to encourage more individual workers to work more and improve social welfare;(2)as far as the replacement rate of early retirement benefits is concerned,it is negatively correlated with social welfare.Therefore,as for the replacement rate of early retirement benefits,we should try our best to reduce the level of benefits to ensure that the retirement system of our country can form a strong "push" for late retirement,so as to promote more individual workers to retire late and work more and improve social welfare;(3)as far as the legal retirement age is concerned,its relationship with social welfare is "inverted U-shaped".So,for legal retirement age,it should not be set too high,which can lead to that the living standards of early retirement people are not guaranteed,and it should not be set too low,which can lead to that the economy’s productive potential can not released.Its specific setting should be considered in combination with the distribution of individual labor heterogeneity factors.Under the model parameters in this paper,the appropriate legal retirement age should be between0.4 and 0.5,that is,the legal retirement age should be between 62 and 65.Based on the above research conclusion,this article believes that in order to cope with the population aging and release the productive potential of the economy,the following suggestions are available for reference in the reform of China’s retirement system and the construction of a “channel” retirement system with Chinese characteristics.First,the idea of quantitative intervention and price intervention should be formed to design the retirement system under different circumstances.Second,the design of the “channe” retirement system with Chinese characteristics should guard against the simple “one size fits all” color,and the modules should be sound,scientific and reasonable,mainly including the two modules of early retirement benefits and delayed retirement benefits.Third,the design concept of the early retirement benefits module should meet two criteria that the early retirement benefits should be keep as low as possible and the legal retirement age should be appropriate,which is also the basic concept of the early retirement benefits module design under the "channel" retirement system in China.Fourth,the design concept of the late retirement benefits module should meet the two criteria of the late retirement benefits as high as possible and the legal retirement age as appropriate,which is also the basic concept of the late retirement benefits module design under the "channel" retirement system in China. |
PDF Full Text Request