The Way Of Corruption Governance

Taking N county of Zhejiang Province as the field research unit and using the case study in the qualitative research method,the study inspects the corruption governance practice of village cadres diachronically of N county and,taking the rural grass-roots power practice as the breakthrough point,carries on the mechanism analysis on the corruption governance of village cadres in the transformation period.After the reform and opening up,the central government established efficiency objectives for economic development,gave county governments greater development autonomy,and adopted GDP indicators as almost the only criterion for government performance evaluation.The county-level government has launched a GDP competition model to continuously develop the economy by operating enterprises,land,and cities,which in turn brings a lot of governance tasks to township governments.Due to the lack of institutional governance resources of township government,a community of interests formed between the township government and village cadres.In order to create conditions for economic development,the county government also tacitly approved the rural community of interests.Under the influence of the rural community of interests,the county and township governments have shaped a protective power structure,actively circumvented the rural corruption governance system,weakened the role of the grassroots supervision department,and caused the system to fail in the corruption governance of village cadres.As the central government has comprehensively strengthened the construction of stability objectives,the tiao-kuai relationship has undergone fundamental changes.The evaluation method of county government has changed from result-oriented to process-oriented,and higher functional department will also carry out a lot of supervision work,prompting county government to pay more and more attention to the standardization and institutionalization of administrative processes,and corruption governance has gradually become the central task of county government.Corruption of village cadres occupies the main part of county corruption,brings huge hidden dangers to rural social stability,and seriously threatens the stability goals construction of county government.For this reason,the county government took the initiative to break the rural community of interests,and then shaped a check-and-balance power structure in the rural society.The county government has shaped a check-and-balance power structure from both vertical and horizontal dimensions.Vertically,the county government has formed an authoritative supervision system in township,and a low-cost reporting model in rural areas through the promotion of supervision to the countryside,and finally shaped a check-and-balance rural power structure,prompting the township government and villagers to jointly check and balance village cadres;Horizontally,the county government has promoted the complexity of the village organization and the village governance rules by importing complex systems,and finally shaped a check-and-balance village power structure,prompting the formation of checks and balances within the village organization.Under the effect of the check-and-balance power structure,the power of village cadres has restricted by multiple forces,and the corruption of village cadres has been effectively governed.However,as the requirements for stability objectives and standardized management have become more and more stringent,the tendency of "top management" has emerged in the process of corruption governance of village cadres.This kind of “top management” has gone beyond the limits of village power checks and balances,and has been prone to inadaptability in rural grassroots practice.As a result,village cadres lose their subjectivity and enthusiasm,which increasingly affects the development of the local rural economy.In order to alleviate the tension between corruption governance and economic development,the county government,on the basis of ensuring that the power of village cadres is standardized,also appropriately adjusted the power check and balance model according to the actual situation in the countryside.However,there is still limited room for county government to adjust independently,and a certain amount of autonomous space is still needed at present,otherwise formalism will continue to breed.Based on the above,the research draws the following conclusions:First,it is incapable to present the richness and complexity of system practice from the institutional perspective,only by incorporating grassroots government behavior into the interpretation framework can we better analyze the practice of village cadre corruption governance.Second,the central government has established different policy objectives by adjusting the item-block relationship,which has brought different organizational system environment to the grassroots government,promoted the grassroots government to shape different power structures,and finally caused different consequences for the corruption governance of village cadres.Third,the corruption governance of village cadres requires a reasonable definition of the institutional space for the operation of village power: on the one hand,it is necessary to regulate the management of village power to prevent the power rent-seeking of village cadres;on the other hand,it is necessary to give village power a certain degree of autonomy to avoid dispelling the enthusiasm of village cadres.