The Problem Of Other Minds In The Philosophy Of Ordinary Language

It has been generally thought that the problem of other minds is: is it and how is it that we know other people have minds, i.e. have thoughts, experiences and emotions?The problem arises from Descartes.When he had said that: "I think, therefore I am", "mind is a substance", and "I know 1 have mind only according to myself, he had expressed such a judgement: mental states are of luminosity to the owner-I have direct konwledge of my own thoughts and experiences, while mental states is distant from others-I only have konwledge of others' behaviors and expressions. Then I have no direct knowledge of other minds.But in ordinary life we have knowledge of other minds. Thus we need explanations. The analogical inference to other minds will say: We can appeal to the many similarities existing between ourselves and others, and then infer from our own states that others have minds.This answer meets many objections. In a word, it roots in Descartes' idea that mind is private which exactly makes the inference impossible.Philosophers after Descartes realized that the answer to the problem of other minds lies in the premises of Cartesian dualism and the key is to find the mistakes in it. Ryle thought that Cartesian dualism had made a severe "category mistake", i.e. confuses the categories about mind with other categories. Mind denotes person's abilities and disposition, so the knowledge of other minds is just the knowledge of their abilities and the ways guiding their behaviours.Austin thought that Cartesian dualism had made dual mistakes, one is the misunderstanding of the category "know", the other is of the words about feeling and emotions etc. From the viewpoint of ordinary life, we can usually know some aspects of other minds. Strawson thought that the problem had arised from the misconception of the meaning of the category :"persons". In fact others really have minds. Wittgenstein clearly pointed out that Cartesian dualism had confused concept. Firstly, it had misunderstood the use of "know". We can say "I know" as long as I have no doubt. Secondly, it had misunderstood these concepts of mental states which doesn't solely refer to mental experiences or behaviours, but a whole related phenomenology. What we had said before: mental states are of luminosity to the owner, just means we have no criteria to ascribe mental states to it's owners. While if we want to ascribe mental states to others, we need criteria such as environment, behaviors and language etc. According to this analysis I can say I know he is pain if I have seen their special behaviors or expressions.From the point of misunderstanding language and confusing concepts, the problem of other minds just seems to be a pseudo-problem which arises from philosophers' imagination. But this conclusion is too haste. In fact all these philosophers we had introduced above always talked the whole mind, especially feeling, anger and pain etc. But mind seems to include other aspects besides feeling, for perhaps you can know 1 am in pain by my behavours, but "if I don't tell you, you will never know whom I had dreamed last night". This tells us that the problem of other minds refers to the kinds of mental experiences or actions: which kinds of mental we have direct knowledge, which we havn't? This dissertation divides two kinds of mental experiences as an attempt.