Contractual Mechanism Study On Third Party Logistics

After survey of Third Party Logistics, this thesis start to study the phenomenon with the contractual characteristic of Third Party Logistics by Game Theory, conclude the relations of the two contractual parties to a Two-stage Game.Firstly, we analyze Third Party Logistics in the condition of the Simple Game, a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium is drawn by Negative Reasoning and no win-win trade appears. The restriction from the third party and in moral changes the payment of two parties and then their strategy choice is changed, Pareto Improving realized. But because of the Asymmetric Information and the Transaction Costs, the parties' Opportunism Behavior will be destined to lead the transaction to fail.The long-term expectation can be given to the parties in the Repeated Game, and which will resolve that Principle-Agent problem. So, Third Party Logistics as a Principle-Agent relationship need an institutional environment of Repeated Game in the case of Incomplete Contract, that is Credit Institution. But the Trigger Strategy must be effective in Repeated Game.Also at last, some feasible advice, especially the healthy Industrial Culture in the basis of construction of Credit Institution, is brought forward in the practice of Third Party Logistics.