Research On Control-based Theories Of Capital Structure

Capital structure, as the concentrated reflection of stakeholders' rights and obligations in company, greatly influences corporate governance structure, sometimes even determines it directly. To study capital structure from the point of corporate control has its important theoretical meaning. It also has important realistic significance to standardize corporate financing action, optimize corporate governance structure, enhance enterprise economic benefit, and then to push forward enterprise reform in China,Mainly using methods of game theory and information economics, this paper researches the choice and optimization of capital structure based on corporate control. The main contents of the dissertation are as following:The introduction explains the research theme and its significance, and also covers the basic concepts and research background. Finally, summarizes the main research aspects and the structure of this dissertation.The latest theories of capital structure are introduced, which are the basic theories of the paper. Through the study of the reciprocity between capital structure and corporate control, this paper explains the close relationship between them, which are both the cause and the effect of the other's, and further introduces several representative models in this field.Chapter three researches interest conflicts among stakeholders and agent costs during the period of corporate financing. The interest conflicts, moral hazards and the cause of them among involved stakeholders during equity and debt financing are carefully analyzed. Then the paper puts forward the means that how to avoid the conflicts and the question of capital structure optimization.According to the characteristics of the corporation when managers are in control, Chapter four develops a model of optimal financial contract, and further studies capital structure optimization based on corporate control and its meaning. By establishing two Subgame models on control contest, influences of capital structure from takeover threat in corporate control market are researched. Finally, from the point of control transfer in bankruptcy, the paper develops a model, in which capital structure changes caused by control transfer are explained, and then advances the choice method of optimal debt structure.Chapter five finds that differences still exist between managers' and shareholders' capital structure choice, even menaced by bankruptcy or takeover. Then a novel method for capital structure optimization is proposed. Based on the considerations of managerial ownership, dynamic game models such as control contest model, equilibrium dividend policy model and security market trade model are established to study managerial ownership choice and corporate ownership structure equilibrium in the case of dispersed shareholders competing for corporate control.Based on the analysis about low efficiency of corporate governance in china, chapter six studies the characteristics of commercial bank governance and why there are such serious problems in its governance. By developing a model about corporate control, managerial ownership and banking lending decision, this chapter mainly studies the affects of managerial ownership on bank's aggregate risk-taking based on corporate control. The viewpoint that corporate control plays a more important role than moral hazard is proposed. In conclusion, suggestions on the policies of state commercial bank governance and aspects that should be treated as emphases in the future study are put forward.