Research On The Environmental Policy Execution Problem Under Nash Game Theory

The economic development of Shenyang is a typical high-speed economicdevelopment in Liaoning province, Shenyang in the northeast region as a whole is notonly occupies an important place in the economic development, but also in the Bahiarim economic belt economy developing in a pivotal status, to build Bridges, coastaland inland development key area and northeast China grand blueprint, but it also hasthe environmental problems. Environmental pollution in Liaoning province is theworst-hit areas, serious affecting the regional environmental quality. Environment hasincreasingly become the key of economic development and environmental protectionwork gradually becomes the Shenyang municipal government, the primary task ofdeveloping economy and improving people’s livelihood. Therefore, to promoteenvironmental protection policy enforcement can effectively promote thegovernment’s economic development speed；improve people’s quality of life andhealth level. Shenyang in the process of development, the heavy economic lightenvironment phenomenon still exists, enormous environmental costs of economicdevelopment. Environmental policy implementation level is still low, environmentalpolicy implementation effect is not ideal, there are still some aspects needimprovement, such as policy participants enthusiasm is low, execution cost is high,the government control of social resources is poor, poor public awareness ofenvironmental protection were problem, the presence of these problems haverestricted the effective implementation of environmental policies in Shenyang.Environmental policy implementation process is a kind of organized activities, also isa process of interest coordination selection. Each participation main body’s interestdemands, information communication, each other between the behavior supervisionand policy practitioners of quality have a direct impact on policy implementationeffect.This article from the perspective of environmental protection policy executivepower, based on the Nash equilibrium of ideas, comprehensive analysis to theShenyang environmental protection policy execution level problem of inefficient andthe causes of these phenomena, to constructively put forward to resolve the Shenyang environmental protection policy executive power weakening level of countermeasures.Paper content is divided into four major parts altogether: the first part, mainlyexpounds the related concepts and theoretical basis, this is the cornerstone of thisarticle; The second part, through field survey analysis, summed up the Shenyangenvironmental problems existing in the policy execution; The third part, analysis ofShenyang environmental causes of policy executive power levels and low; The fourthpart, the summary proposed targeted policies and measures to improve the level ofenvironmental policy implementation effect.