An Empirical Research On Correlation Between Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies

Ownership structure is the interior structure of corporate owners, which then determine the corporate governance. The efficiency of corporate governance is embodied by the corporate performance. This paper analyzes the correlation between ownership structure and corporate performance of Chinese listed companies qualitatively and quantitatively by means of statistics and econometrics methods.Several conclusions have been drawn. Firstly, ownership dispersal shouldn't be advocated at the moment. Proper ownership concentration is beneficial to the improvement of corporate governance and corporate performance. Secondly, ownership control is an important way to restrain the act of plundering conducted by large shareholders while protecting the rights of minority shareholders. Thirdly, compared to the inefficiency of state-owned shares and negotiable shares, the percentage of shares held by artificial persons is positively related with corporate performance. Fourthly, interior shareholding has little stimulant effect on executive of corporate. There is no positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by executive and corporate performance. Finally, corporate income is the basic element that impacts the shareholding percentage of institutional investors. Institutional investors act negatively in the corporate governance.Based on these conclusions, we have some policy recommendations. Firstly, ownership concentration should be kept properly in Chinese listed companies and the shareholding percentage of large shareholders should be declined to achieve ownership control. Secondly, decrease the percentage of state-owned shares by means of selling them to artificial persons. Problem of the absence of the available state-owned shareholders should be solved as soon as possible. Thirdly, increase the percentage of negotiable shares while developing institutional investors. Induce the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. Finally, innovate new forms of executive shareholding, which will stimulate executive to act more efficiently.