| In the 13th Century Trust emerged firstly in British, after 700 years ,it has great influenced in monetary market, capital market and industrial field in most of the developed countries. Nowadays, trust has become one of the most important branch in finance, together with bank, insurance and securities. However, in China, the situation is quietly different, people didn't recognized trust until 1919 when it was introduced into Shanghai. Actually, since 1979, trust has gotten its authentic development just only for 25 years. At first glance, trust fail to keep abreast of the World's average level resulting in lacking of history in China. However we find that the unsatisfying condition mostly links with the ignorance of institutional construction. In this paper, to understand the institutional construction in trust in our country, we find a significant relation between institutional transformation and basic theories of institutional economics. Further, the analysis on trust realities, the consideration to current institutional frame and some policy suggestions arc proposed. Here are six sections served for illustrating.In chapter 1 ,at first, I introduce the topic of my thesis, interrelated documents and the way and the method of my research. Furthermore, I introduce the origin of trust and summarize several elementary theories in the field in western countries. There are 4 fund mental ideas: (1) Separation of ownership and beneficial rights. (2) Independence of trust property. (3) Limited liability. (4) Continuity in the management of trust. All of them consist of the basic contents of functional evolution and systematic designing of trust.Beginning with the introduction of trust's history in china, I describe several different stages of trust since it was introduced to our country in chapter 2. In this section, a universal model is proposed. As an important step toward understanding the model, I analyzed 5 adjustment of trust from 1979. Note that an interactive mechanism exists between the orientation of government policies and trust company's behavior, under the circumstance of administrative interference. The mechanism is complicated; firstly, policy orientation is the determinant. Secondly, the anchor point of trust and its institutional arrangement depend on the conductive mechanism of policies. Thirdly, trust company act as a microcosmic acceptor to macro-polices. Institutional arrangement determines the behavior of trust companies meanwhile their behavior responds with policy orientation by changing financial and economical environments. It is well known that new policies will be formulated and the orientation will be changed for the transition of macro-situation. According to the essential opinions mentioned above, new policies and administration will bring about new adjustment of trust as well as its new institutional arrangements.In chapter 3, I analyzed the relationship between institutional evolution of trust industry and financial innovation from the angle of institutional economics. Especially, based on the analysis of chapter 2, I set up a three-phases game model about theevolution of supervisory system and financial innovation in trust industry. At last, I draw a conclusion that it is the defects of trust industry's supervisory system that stimulate the abnormal innovative behaviors among trust companies. Furthermore, upon the relationship between the inner-governance and trust company's innovation, I explain the crucial impacts on the innovative behaviors arising from the defects of governing structure and point out the key to the problem is the identity superposition between institutional supplier and financial innovator.In chapter 4, after the new trust institutional frame which is in the core of "Trust Law" was established, there are two crucial problems in front of our country's trust industry. One is the problem of reorder orientation. The other is the problem of restructuring developing strategies. Upon the first problem, I think that our trust industry should stick to the...
|
PDF Full Text Request