The Methodology Game Analysis And Japan-China Economic Partnership

In recent days, economic globalization and the open policy of China have expanded the relationship between Japan and China. This relationship has promoted friendship between Japan and China, but has also caused some conflicts to arise. Because human actions are inevitably constrained by the scarcity of resources, the behavior of one economic subject will influence the be-harbored expectation of other economic subjects in the distribution of limited profit. Strategies are based on the expectations for other economic subjects. This reciprocal choice of strategies will form "game form". The game form will proceed toward equilibrium. However, this does not mean that there is only one equilibrium, factors which influence equilibriums are not exogenous variables, but are consequences of equilibriums reached in former stages. The exchange between Japan and China is forming many equilibriums, some not so ideal for the two countries. The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the structures of equilibrium formation.The current situation of governmental and nongovernmental economic exchange will be summarized. The main topic in governmental economic exchange is ODA. More Chinese people have yet to realize the considerable efficiency of ODA which sometimes becomes the focal point of conflict between Japan and China. Nongovernmental economic exchange is the focal point of this thesis, and some examples dealing with this matter rose. Because of the complexity of real issues, simplified models are approximated to real issues; instead although these models have limited effectiveness in the real world, they still greatly assist in our understanding of economics. Many models of game methods are based mainly on cooperative and non-cooperative games, depicting the capability of cooperation games in expanding achievable equilibriums.Through analysis of the case of Chong Qing , the long term friendship between Japan and China, will be evaluated.