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Study On The Incentiving And Cooperation Mechanism Based On Game Theory

Posted on:2004-02-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:C X ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360122970381Subject:Technical Economics and Management
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The employee incentives and team cooperation are very important subjects of modern personnel management researches. In the research, game theory is a major approach to be used to study employee incentives and team cooperation and also to construct the game theory foundation. Incentive and cooperation are two important factors for companies to improve the workers' efficiency. But the two factors are mutually relative and contradictory. In order to study one factor, the other must be studied at the same time. Because a new studying tool, game theory, studies the mutual influence and reciprocity between participants, and the best strategies, and the competition and cooperation between workers is exact what game theory studies, it is used to study the competition and cooperation between workers. With a careful study of previous researches, this dissertation will analyze the team cooperation and incentive structure from five facets.First, the team cooperation game mechanism without principals is studied. Because of the limitations the traditional game theories in explaining the players' cooperation and Centipede Game Paradox, secret-love game model is constructed to analyze the rational foundation of cooperative game. And the evolving process from incomplete information to mutual knowledge is analyzed. Two key links are needed if Pareto Dominance cooperation is to become the only Nash Equilibrium. The first link is disturbing the second-best equilibrium to make it breaking away from the original equilibrium situation. This process may be resulted from the incentives of exterior factors, also from the risk-averse measures decided by the initial property and financing abilities of players and the differences of discount coefficient. The second key link is learning and signaling. When equilibrium breaking away from the original orbit, players will modify their type judgments, choose the best behaviors, and send cooperative signals to others. For the second link processing successfully, it is important that players should emphasize long-term benefits while an infinite game term is not necessary.Then, This article studies the connection between team cooperation and incentive structure, the best incentive structure when there's sabotaging activities in teams. And agent cost is analyzed comparatively with the best incentive structure when no sabotaging activities happen in teams. The significance of competition and cooperation among team workers under special conditions as well as the characters and capability structure of team members and the organization structure of productions in teams based on competition and cooperation are also studied. All these studies show that although an increasing on piece wage rate and the bonus disparity will not only prompt team worker' harder-working, it will bring about the problem of sabotaging among employees. While reducing the piece wage rate and widening bonus disparity help to eliminate the enthusiasm for sabotaging, employees' working diligence will also be lowered. If team members will sabotage and team cooperation is rather important, enterprises should not use promoting bonus to incent team members to work hard in equilibrium. Enterprises should pay fixed wage equally to every one and piece wage should be adopted to prompt team workers to work hard. If there does not exist sabotaging in team, in order to reduce the productivity measurement error and to reduce employees' risk cost, in equilibrium only fixed wages and bonuses are paid to employees. The non-cooperative workers are willing to work in cooperative teams while cooperative workers tend to reject those workers who are not cooperative and reject working in non-cooperative teams. If cooperation means much to teams, bonus gap should be shortened as much as possible and even top managers should be enrolled from outside. When products markets are favorable, there is no need to guarantee the employees' cooperation since adequate competition does good to teams' vigor and energy. While the market is not favorable,...
Keywords/Search Tags:incentive structure, cooperation, manpower management, and game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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