Font Size: a A A

Study On Incentive Of Executive Stock Option

Posted on:2004-05-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S B LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360095455532Subject:Forestry Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a long period of valid incentive mechanism, the system of executive stock option is an arrangement of salary. It functions under the hypotheses of agency theory and human resource property theory. The modern allotment theory and risk theory is an innovation of system that apply the option theory to a kind of modern system that more match the value tropism of the manager in market economy and the demand for development of the enterpriseExecutive stock option is an incentive mechanism for senior managers of modern enterprise that act solution to the agency problem. The paper establishes and studies model to testify that executive stock option prompts the benefit correspondent between managers and stockholders and helps to solve the problem about long-term development and innovation and manager choice of companies, this paper tries to set forth that stock option adapt to manager and kernel technician and try to establish the model to quantize the optimal stock on the problem of the price and the quantity of stock on condition that the relations between contributions by forms of the company and the surplus value and the type of human resource.Because of obstacles in the system, this paper analyzes the method and the operation of stock option and set forth the relative suggestions on the theory of economics and management.
Keywords/Search Tags:Stock Option, Surplus Property, Exercise Price, Exercise Quantity
PDF Full Text Request
Related items