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Study Of Securities Investment Funds Governance Mechanism

Posted on:2005-10-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D P EFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360122997863Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The core problem of the development of security investment funds field is how to protect the benefits of investors and build up the investors' confidence. As a result, it is essential to erect a good management structure. On the one hand, we have to establish series of law codes to standardize relevant participants behaviors; on the other hand, we should create the reasonable and scientific rules to coincide the benefits between consigners and assignees, which will make the assignees manage fund assets consciously to maximize the profits of fund holders. The structure of fund management is the base of funds existence and development.The domestic academe has produced plenty of researches on the structure of company management, but we are the beginner for the theory of funds management structure. Funds, instead of funds management company, is different from company organization in the management structure. As a kind of contract organization, the management of the structure is relied on the independent choice and unrestricted quit power of relevant participants in horizontal direction, instead of the maintenance by the inner order and obedience in vertical direction.As one of the organizers of the fund, the fund management company is the biggest inner participant in the contracted-fund. That is why it is easy to create benefits conflict. In the benefits conflicts among the relevant participants, the focus is between the fund holders and fund management company, not the common conflict among big and small shareholders. Fund management company is the real controller of fund which is quite similar as the professional manager in the equity separating companies. The conflict between fund management company and fund holder is caused because the income of fund management company comes from the management expense debiting from fund while the management expenses are deducted from fund net assets which caused the deduction of fund holders' income. Accordingly, a rational fund management company will try the best to maximize the management expenses opposite to the benefits of fund holders. In China, fund management company is not only the organizer but also the holder and the administrator. This situation makes the conflicts, from fund controller and non-controller, to holder and administrator, focusing on fund management company.In fact, the investors buying fund is to buy the ability and responsibility of fund administrator. But it is hard to observe directly the administrator' s ability and responsibility. In modern fund field, fund administrator is divided into fund consultant, fund manufacturer and fund distributor. After selling fund, fund distributor submits the capital to fund manufacturer and the fund manufacturer will choose and assign fund consultant to manage it. The procedure makes it is more difficult to know the administrator' s ability and responsible degree even to be impossible. On the other hand, there is no any guarantee for the investors after they bought the fund. The investors only have a kind of expectation for the income in future. The kind expectation can not get any protection in laws which is the core problem in fund market.Since the investor is in the disadvantaged position in the conflict between fund investor and administrator , in order to maintain the investor' s benefits, it is essential to choose a kind of rational inspiration and restriction system before the investor consigns the contracts. Effective inspiration and restriction system is an important component in security investment fund management.The thesis is to build a long term economic inspiration and restriction system model by non-entire information dynamic Game theory, to research the effect of the fund investor and administrator pursuing maximized efficiency under the non-entire and non-symmetrical condition and analyze the deciding and restricted factors of security investment fund inspiration and restriction system. Based on the analysis, the thesis analyzes the efficiency of security investment fund inspiration and rest...
Keywords/Search Tags:moral hazard, incentive and constraint mechanism, dynamic Game, principal-agent theory
PDF Full Text Request
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