Study On Government Regulation Of Moral Hazard In Private Pension Institutions In China

China has rapidly entered an aging society,with 40 million disabled and mentally retarded elderly.Meanwhile,significant changes have taken place in the family structure of urban and rural areas in China,such as "4-2-1" and "8-4-2-1".The traditional family pension mode is no longer suitable for the needs of Chinese economic development,and private pension institutions will play an important role in the socialized pension mode.However,there are widespread problems in private pension institutions in China,such as high investment,low profitability,and shortage of talents.What is more,there are also vicious incidents in which private pension institutions cause murder due to mismanagement.In order to regulate the pension service market and restrict illegal operation,the government must strengthen the supervision and management of private pension institutions.Therefore,this subject has very important practical significance.Through applying principal-agent and evolutionary game model to the quantitative study of government regulation of moral hazard in private pension institutions in China,it expands the scope of application of game theory and has certain theoretical significance.This paper has carried out research on the government supervision of the moral hazard in pension institutions.The main work and achievements are as follows:Firstly,this paper uses the principal-agent theory of game theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship between private pension institutions and the elderly,and points out the moral hazard existing in the private pension institutions.Then,a transaction contract model which aimed at restraining the moral hazard of private pension institutions is built.The paper draws the conclusions that the model is conducive to improving the quality of service for private pension institutions.Secondly,under the condition of limited rationality and incomplete information,the evolutionary game model between the private pension institutions and the government is constructed by using the evolutionary game theory.According to the national conditions of China and the different supervision modes of the government,this paper use evolutionary game to establish the replication dynamic equation,discuss the strategic choice of the two sides under different conditions,and analyze their stability.The study found that the irregularities in the operation of private pension institutions are mainly affected by the degree of punishments,the supervision of third parties(networks,citizens)and the success rate of government supervision.If the government can implement appropriate regulatory measures for different situations,it can effectively curb the irregularities of private pension institutions.Finally,aiming at the problem of government supervision of moral hazard in private pension institutions,this paper puts forward some measures to avoid the moral hazard in private pension institutions: improving the incentive and supervision mechanism;improving the transparency of information in the pension service market;using the third party to coordinate supervision;establishing a joint punishment mechanism;attaching the importance of trade associations;improving the success rate of government supervision;and improving relevant laws and regulations.