Analyzing & Designing Of The Incentive Mechanism In Sale Management And Contract

On enterprise internal market management, the sale department is how to sell the product of the enterprise. The enterprise must design a incentive mechanism to enhance sale management. It is or not necessary to let the third man, such as the agent, take part in selling. According to the theory of the game between the principal and the subordinate, the paper analyzes detailedly the sale management internal market management, then draw a conclusion that it is feasibility and rationality for the sale department and the enterprise to please the agent to participate in selling.In the contract relationship, when profit assignment is set to be closely relation to output in the contract between enterprise capital owner and employees, it is or not necessary to work in the third man who has rich working experience and ability and know enterprise management well acts as enterprise contractor. According to static Principal-agent model of information economics, the paper established some mathematics models with rational hypothesis, and on the base of these models analysis ,we draw some conclusion as follow:When profit assignment is set to be closely relation to output in the contractbetween enterprise capital owner and employees, it will reduce risk cost cause by asymmetry information, raise profit, and carry benefit to enterprise capital owner, employees, and contractor all, that the third man who has rich working experience and ability and know enterprise management well acts as enterprise contractor.