Institutional Effect And Game Analysis Of Tax Evasion

A check all over the country by the national tax bureau shows that the ratio of the number of taxpayer involving tax evasion to the total number checked is about half .The amount of money involved in tax evasion is up to hundreds billion of Yuan.The problem of tax revenue loss is not only the problem in china but also the difficult questions that the other countries have to face. What is the essential reason for tax evasion and how to effectively prevent and deal with tax evasion are the problems remains to be solved.The A-S model and expectation income maximum model are the basis for the analysis on the problem of tax evasion, and the theoretical and empirical studies based on these models are astrictive to economists. There is more qualitative analysis on the problem for tax evasion in relative to the quantitative analysis on this problem; the latter is hard to find in Chinese literature on this respect. Most of the studies on the problems for the tax evasion are mainly about the discussion for the system arrangement. So we cannot deeply talk about the reason of tax evasion.Our study covered quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis, normative analysis and empirical analysis. On the basis of present research in china and other countries, we analyses the effect of tax evasion on fiscal revenues and resource distribution mechanism; Using the extension of the corrected model, we try to explore the fundamental reason for the tax evasion; And it is applied to interaction relation and we also applied our analysis to the study for the financial trade system. Based on the analysis for information structure, we put forward system arrangement and some new ideas to solve the problem of tax evasion in accordance with the law.