The Economic Analysis Of Compulsive Information Disclosure In Security Market

Compulsive Information Disclosure is an important aspect of security market regulation. Regulation theory and practice in the security market is walking between Compulsive Information Disclosure and Substantive Regulation, whichever puts emphasis on information disclosure value in itself. The paper is based on economics theory and analyze the optimum of Compulsive Information Disclosure systemically.The Chapter One analyzes the necessity of Compulsive Information Disclosure theoretically. In the field of relative theories, it exist different views about the necessity of Compulsive Information Disclosure, which can be sorted to supporting and against views. Generally, based on perfect hypotheses, Compulsive Information Disclosure is useless. But when the perfect hypotheses changed, it can be necessary.The Chapter Two analyzes the most optimal quantity of Compulsive Information Disclosure. At the beginning, applying to the firm theory, the chapter analyzes a profit-maximizing corporation which issue stocks in the security market are willing to disclose the quantity of information, and the quantity is the optimal quantity which can be compared with the requirement of Compulsive Information Disclosure. Then we can conclude that whether Compulsive Information Disclosure is optimal or not. When the quantity of a profit-maximizing corporation is less than the requirement, it can be Excessive Information Disclosure. In this situation, corporations have incentive to illegalize the information disclosure. We discuss the conditions of illegal disclosure by corporations and the optimal quantity of profit-maximizing Corporations.The Chapter Three analyzes Compulsive Information Disclosure in Chinese Security Market. Firstly we can list the law about information disclosure regulation in order to discuss the completeness of these rules. Then we analyze the fulfilling effect of the rules. Next we analyze the features of the information supply by corporations and the information demand by investors in Chinese Security Market. The aim is check the applicability of these regulative rules.The Chapter Four gives the policy suggestions about how to complete Compulsive Information Disclosure and regulate the corporations.The purpose of this paper research the optimum of Compulsive Information Disclosure .In the end, the conclusion is that the optimum of Compulsive Information Disclosure can be made by the bargaining procedure of the corporation behavior and the regulator behavior .Until the equilibrium of the optimal quality of the corporation and the requirement of the Compulsive Information Disclosure, the bargaining can not end.