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Benefit Equilibrium, Public Choice And Institutional Change: An Evidence From Reform Of China's Postal Savings

Posted on:2005-11-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J S LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360125959889Subject:National Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The reform of China's Postal Savings is studied as a case to explain the intrinsic characteristics of China's Institutional Reform, with Institutional Change Theories of New Institutional Economics and Public Choice Theories used as the main tools for analysis of the case. Although the reform of China's Postal Savings looks like an institutional change mainly supplied by the Central Government, actually many institutions played a role, including the Post Office, the Central Bank, the Central Government, commercial banks, local governments, the country's Credit Unions, the Fiscal Banks and, finally, Postal Savings depositors. Similarly, China's Institutional Reform is the result of games of correlative institutional bodies. The study divides into three parts. First, an introduction of Institutional Change Theories of New Institutional Economics and Public Choice Theories and their application in China. Second, a theoretical analysis of the factors behind the reform of China's Postal Savings to explain the intrinsic change logic of this reform. Third, a theoretical summing-up and some suggestions for the reform of China's Postal Savings and China's Institutional Reform.
Keywords/Search Tags:Benefit Equilibrium, Public Choice, Institutional Change, Postal Savings, Institutional Reform
PDF Full Text Request
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