Research On Dynamic Supervise Of Credit Risk In Commercial Bank Based On Asymmetric Information

In information economy times, it becomes more serious that the phenomenon of asymmetric information between two business parties. Information Economics believes that adverse selection and moral risk will happen if the business parties have asymmetric information on the deals during a business. It is important for a commercial bank which creates profits depending on credit that it adopts what kind of method to obtain and distinguish beneficial information as much as possible so as to keep on sustained development. After China entry WTO, it becomes essential that bank industry transform from close to open and takes part in international competition according to the new basel agreement. So it takes many scholars and experts to pay much attention to how to improve credit risk supervise level for our country's commercial banks and to find supervise approach suitable to Chinese characteristics. Little applying research about domestic bank credit risk supervise has been done though there are so much theory research has been done.This paper tends to analyze how and why commercial bank credit risk come into being by game theory and systemic ,dynamic concepts under the hypothesis of asymmetric information in order to acquire the operable supervise measures which adapt to our country's medium and small banks credit supervise.The first part of the article adopts game theory to analyze the mechanisms and reasons how and why commercial bank credit risk form. The dynamic game model show how to handleinformation when the commercial bank makes decision and supervise risks. The second part points the problem existing in static state credit risk supervise model taken by our country's commercial bank by analyzing domestic and static state credit risk supervise theory. The third part puts forward to solve problems existing in our country's commercial bank credit risk dynamic supervise by dynamic insight, institutional and technologic supervising means ,from macroscopic and microcosmic aspects and combined with abroad credit risk supervise development course. In the fourth part, it is pointed what the difference and common between the conclusions drew under dynamic and static state supervise theory , and the matters that commercial banks should pay attention to under the dynamic supervise condition.There are two new concepts in the paper: the first one is that dynamic game model is adopted to analyze the mechanisms and reasons for that commercial bank credit risks form. Then, some advices are given about the commercial bank decision-making. The second one , considering our country commercial bank credit risk supervise concept are still in the stage of static state ,so some operable approaches are given in the paper which match with our country's commercial banks risk supervise development level by adopting systemic and dynamic concepts.