Study On The Asymmetrical Information Issues Of Commercial Health Insurance Market In China

With the development of economics, social progress and the application of the advanced medical technologies, the medical expense is treading to ascend. Determined by the comparatively low levels of the productivity forces in the primary stage of our socialism, China's social medical insurance is and will remain pretty limited for quite a long time. So the commercial health insurance is becoming more and more important. But the actuality of the commercial health insurance in China is not so gratifying-Civilians can't obtain a practical medical guarantee although they have a rising consuming demand, the insurance companies actively invest in this market but it is hard to profit, and the country is feeing up a difficulty that there is no guarantees for a serious disease after medical innovation. The main reason for the dilemma is that the asymmetrical information in the commercial health insurance market leads to some problems of reversed choice and moral hazard. How to establish a restrict system about the behavior of reversed choice and moral hazard? Now it is becoming the urgent problem in China. It is also the theme of this thesis.At first We analyze each actor's trait in health insurance market and their mutual relationships, the behavior and root of moral hazard and reversed choice, then do an all-around review of the commercial health insurance market in China so that to find out the system limitation that reversed choice and moral hazard are based on. On this basis, we put forward to intensify the national supervisal system, establish enterprises' and individual credit system, establish communication platform about health insurance information, strengthen the management of deputy in their latter career, innovate the payment way of medical service and improve the insurance agency system so as to supply reference and enlightenment for the construction and innovation of the commercial health insurance system.The theme of this thesis is quite practical and has a definite standpoint. Whenanalyzing the principle of overlooking the asymmetric information, we apply the model "agency market-credit" in information economics to the commercial health insurance market, and establish a mathematical model. Then we obtain some quantitative results that have instructional significance for practical problems, which makes this thesis novel.