Study On The Motive Of Management Buy-Out (MBO) Of Listed Firms Based On Governance Factor

Because of the positive role to enterprise management, especially to management, such as distinct property right, strengthening encourage, etc, management buy-out which evolved from the western is approved by listed firms gradually. But MBO is restricted by various kinds of factors and realistic conditions, so compared with western market economy country, our listed firms MBO have their own characteristics in many aspects, which has determined that MBO developing in our country has its own weaknesses, then supervisor decided to stop MBO. But reality is that various kinds of "curve mbo" are popular on a large scale, what strength has promoted MBO? That is to say what is the motive of MBO? This paper makes a concrete analysis of the motive of listed firms MBO in empirical method in term of governance factor.This paper has reviewed the motive theory of MBO at first, the classical theory argues that MBO has speculation motive, raid motive, managerialism motive and distinct property right motive. In this way, I have a basic understanding to the motive of MBO under different situations, this establishes the foundation for studying MBO of our country further. And then analysis concrete motive of mbo in western ripe market country, at the same time, combine the characteristic of our country sample company, put forward of listed company motive of mbo by form of hypothesis: Inside people's interests maximize, big shareholder's interests maximize, enterprise value underestimate, entrepreneur value underestimate, listed company strip non-core business, listed company take off "the red cap". Among the empirical part, this paper adopt event study to analysis the cumulative abnormal return in the MBO event windows at first, the result is that there is remarkable cumulative abnormal return; then analysis big shareholder's interests maximize motive by adopting theory identification and share bonus behavior after MBO, the result indicates that the company inclines to share bonus in large proportion after MBO; through excessive price rate, we can see that stock right transfer price in MBO is greatly lower than real value, and state-run assets losses heavily, at the same time, the management performance before and after MBO by factor analysis indicates that there is obvious improvement in the management performance after MBO, therefore, this paper argues that the value of enterprises is underestimated seriously; the result through regress indicates that senior administration authorities' salary and the management performances of enterprises become positive correlation, at the same time,senior administration authorities' salary increases obviously after MBO, so the entrepreneur value is underestimated; then the paper analysis HengYuanXiang, HongDou stock company's strip the non-core business, take off "the red cap" respectively by adopting case research. At last, we provide some advice for improving MBO performance according our economic policy at present.