Study On Problems Of Stated-owned Commercial Banks' Corporate Governace

At first, the thesis provides the definition, the mechanism, and characteristics of the commercial banks' corporate governace. The above introduction makes us understand all the factors relevant to the corporate governance are how to affect the development of the commercial banks . This will also help us to catch on how to transform the relationship of all the factors in the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China .Secondly, the thesis analyzes evolution of the corporate governace in the state-owned banks from the angle of view of path dependence in the institutional evolution, and still investigates the status quo and sources of problems of the corporate governace of the state-owned commercial banks in China .We conclude that the main source of the problems of the corporate governace of the banks lies in the governance system of "substituting administrative right for the proprietorship of the state-owned financial assets" from the special initial institutional setting of China. The "governace system" results in remarkable problems , such as, defect of the mechanism of choosing eligible operators of the state-owned commercial banks , distortion of incentive mechanism , and " insider control problem ". And the situation will be locked in for a long time unless the outsider forces do not interpose .So how to break "the situation locked in", and establish the normative corporate governace will be a beginning point to solve these problems.Thirdly, the thesis analyzes the typical two model of corporate governance in western countries abiding by the principle of a combination of "comparing, using the experiences of other countries for reference , and innovating the institution of the state-owned commercial banks", The revelation is that, restricted by the special informal institution and initial institutional condition , every countryhas different model of the corporate governance, hereby, China should choose the own model of the corporate governace of the banks in accord with the special institutional condition of China.Due to the limitation of the state-owned capital , the gradual exit of the state-owned financial assets and entry of clear benefit bodies , i.e. non-state-owned equity entity, is a unavoidable method to solve the problems of the corporate governance of the banks.The author suggests that China should innovate the institution of property rights of the state-owned financial capital to solve the problem of governace of ownership of the banks. Thus the state-owned commercial banks should be reconstructed consistent to the request of corporate governance structure of state-owned financial shareholding company, the operating entity firstly fulfill joint-stock banks which will diversify the property owner , at the same time matching corporate governance for the group and its subsidiary will be respectively brought in to solve " the insider control problem " and the problem of distortion of incentive mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks.