The Rise Of Iraqi Shiites And Iran-Iraq Realtions In Post-War Era

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's authority in Iraq in 2003, there is a debate in the academia that whether Iran is the de facto biggest winner of Iraqi War and the Shiite groups in Iraq are serving as a proxy of Iranian interests. In response, this thesis would argue that the Shiites in Iraq have not served as Iran's proxy up till now, nor would they do in the future. To underpin this argument, the thesis first analyzes the Shiite movement in Iraq and particularly the four major Shiites groups there---the traditional cleric class represented by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Islamic Da'wa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), and the Sadr Movement and points out although they all have various connections with Iran, their identities, political goals and interests are in fact different from Iran's. After that the thesis analyzes three environmental factors that have imposed pressures on Iraqi Shiites, namely the Iraqi Sunnis, the United States and other Sunni Arab states in Middle East. Because they are all worried about Iran's influence and intervention to Iraq, they have formed significant pressure on the Shiite groups in Iraq to reduce their linkage with Iran. On the other hand, the thesis also tries to seek explanation from Iran's perspective. It would argue that contrary to common belief, Iran is facing a deteriorating geopolitical situation and it has adopted a defensive regional strategy. In terms of Iran-Iran relations, Iran has no unrealistic illusion to turn the Iraqi Shiites as its proxy. The aim of Iranian government is to ensure a friendly Shiite-led government in Iraq to stand as a buffer zone between it and the US. As for conclusion, the thesis would further emphasize that Iran-Iraq relation in post-war era is asymmetrical in its very nature due to the imbalance of state powers and the inconsistency of security preferences. However, as this asymmetry is reducing slowly, the two countries may reach a re-balance in the future, in which Iran would have even less influences in Iraq.