Research On The Dynamic Incentive And Supervision Models Of The Enterprise's Managers

Establishing and perfecting the incentive and restrict mechanism of the enterprise's managers is an important condition that ensures the managers' abilities exert normally. And that is also a vital measure to improve the state-owned enterprises' reform of our country. The thesis mainly studies the dynamic and supervision problem of the enterprise's managers.First, in the study of the dynamic incentive on the enterprise's managers, this thesis reestablishes the ratchet effects model by introducing Cobb-Douglas production function into it and categorizing the managers' efforts as reward effort and non-reward incentive effort. And based on the system theory's view, this paper establishes the alleviating ratchet effects model that considers the influence of the first time's output on the second time. In order to hold more information of the enterprise's operation and the manager's effort level, the enterprise's owner can introduce a supervisor to decrease the information's asymmetry degree between them. However, the owner also needs to prevent the supervisor colluding with the manager and the supervisor abusing his authority. Based on the Vafai model, the paper establishes the manager's supervision model, and proves that the agent's effort level and leisure-enjoying factor will change the contracts' results. Supervision and constraint mechanism on enterprise's managers is an important condition which ensures that the enterprise can operate effectively and the managers can exert their abilities normally. But there is little research on how to use a variety of supervision mechanisms on the managers' management corruption behaviors. This thesis studies the optimal supervision level of one single mechanism based on the supervision game model in the game theory. And according to the different goals that the controller (government) of each supervision mechanism's operation pursues, this paper puts forward the cost-income approach and the mean-deviation approach to determine each mechanism's optimal proportion of combined supervision mechanisms. The two approaches offer good theory reference to study the enterprise's managers' supervision problem quantitatively. Finally the paper puts forward some advice on perfecting the kinds of conditions to ensure the managers' incentive and supervision mechanism operate effectively.