A Study On Incentive Mechanism Of Managers Of State-owned Enterprises

One of the main reasons about the low efficiency of own-stated enterprises is that there is lack of effective incentive mechanism to manager. Setting up effective incentive mechanism to manager is very important for elevating efficiency of manager of own-stated enterprises and achieving stable preservation and increment of own-stated asset. For a long time, income of the manager of own-stated enterprises is not high, so during the period of changing from planned economy to market economy, the tendency of "economy human" selfishness is very obvious. In the game between manger of own-stated enterprises and consignor of own-stated asset-own-stated asset managing department, it is inevitable for manger to achieve own utility maximum in price of damaging benefit of consignor. So effective incentive mechanism of manager is not only to achieve the aim of consignor of own-stated asset to abase agency cost produced by adverse selection of manager, but also to achieve motive of own utility maximum.The dissertation uses theory about organizational behavior and information economics to discuss how to set up effective incentive mechanism to manager. Firstly, the dissertation analyses economy human's peculiarity and risk-bias feature and draw the conclusion that utility of manager under different risk-bias is fundamental designing premise of effective incentive mechanism to manager; Secondly, the dissertation analyses the importance of manager market with the feature of implicit incentive and draw the conclusion that selecting manager through the manager market could eliminate many drawbacks produced by administrative appointment; At last, the dissertation analyses the role of the manager of own-stated enterprises as center signer in contract of enterprise, illustrate that the manager as the manpower who gives asset is the important part of property rights of enterprises and draw the conclusion that manager shared surplus claiming rights of enterprises is effective explicit incentive mechanism, then design optimum incentive contract of own-stated enterprise's manager in the base of this conclusion and build the shared surplus coefficient of manager; on the other hand, in order to prove the availability of shared surplus coefficient of manager as explicit incentive mechanism, the dissertation collects 1070 list companies whose 2002 year's fiscal report published before April 30,2003 in shanghai and shenzhen stock market as effective samples, make regression analysis between the holding stock of manager and enterprise's performance and draw the conclusion that the holding stock of manager hasexplicit and weak correlation relationship with enterprise's performance and illustrates the availability of manager shared surplus claiming rights of enterprises with explicit incentive mechanism. From above three sides the dissertation draw the conclusion that applying mutual replenished incentive combined with the manager market incentive with feature of implicit incentive and incentive of shared surplus claiming rights of enterprises with feature of explicit incentive is the effective incentive mechanism to manager.