A Comparative Analysis Of The Relationship Between The Corporate Governance Structure And The Performance Of The Private Listed Companies In China

Nowadays, the private listed companies have become an important force in the capital market of China. Because the private enterprises, especially the listed ones are greatly related to the reform of the state-owned enterprises and property rights, they have been the focus of research for several years. In this dissertation, we choose the nature of the listed company's final controller as the criterion of sample separation, and conduct comparative analysis between the private and the typical state-owned listed companies in China, including comparative analysis on each year's sample and the pooling sample. To draw a reliable conclusion, the competition of the products market is also concerned. Special research on the pooling sample of the private listed companies is conducted in order to catch their nature. Based on the former literature, we try to do some innovation in this dissertation. As to the variables design, we consider the internal and external mechanism of corporate governance. Particularly, we try to test whether some factors are only driven by the policies made by the market supervisors. In the part of regression analysis, we use two complementary kinds of model to test the difference between the three categories of sample. Moreover, the analysis based on the competition of industry enhances the reliability of our result. The positive result of single year's sample and pooling sample is nearly consistent. The private listed companies, especially listed through initial public offering are significantly superior to the typical state-owned listed companies, not only on corporate governance structure but also on performance characterized by EPS and ROE. Furthermore, we find that the change of number (and ratio) of the independent directors in 2002 (and 2003) is merely a result of policy requirements, not driven by market competition, so they should not be treat as a determinant of corporate performance. In the regression analysis, private companies listed through initial public offering is also significantly different form the other two categories of sample. But the private companies listed through "buy shell"are only significantly different from the typical state-owned listed companies in pooling sample regression. One reason is that the integration after "buy shell"requires a rather long time. Based on the competitive degree of products market, we find some further evidence about the difference between the private listed companies and the typical state-owned ones. The lower of the competitive degree of the industry, the smaller is the number of the private listed companies. We find that the difference has some industry characters. First, the difference on corporate governance structure is significant for almost all industries. But in industries in which the competitive degree is rather low (even approximate monopoly), the performance difference between the private listed companies and the typical state-owned ones is not significant. In all, the comparative and regression result both shows that the private companies listed through initial public offering is quite different from the typical state-owned listed companies. The difference lies in two sides: superior corporate governance structure and better operating performance. As to the other category of private companies, they do not show significant difference compared to the typical state-owned listed companies, especially in regression analysis. Since the integration after "buy shell"is a complicated process and...