An Empirical Investigation On The Condition And Efficiency Of Executive Ownership Incentives In The Publicly Listed Chinese Stock Companies

Executive ownership incentives which is a valid long-term incentives is gradually spread in Chinese stock companies and already affects these companys' performance. This thesis uses the data of the publicly listed Chinese stock companies to research the relevance between the executive ownership incentives and the performance of these companies by empirical evidence.There are three main contests in this thesis. First, we analyze the implementation breadth of the executive ownership incentives with the industry, area and scale variable, and analyze the implementation depth of the executive ownership incentives through comparing the executives' quantity of ownership with their salary. Second, we describe the several patterns of executive ownership incentives, and sort them into real pattern and phantom pattern; then, we analyze the distribution and the impact on the company's performance of these two patterns. Third, we estimate the incentive efficiency of the executive ownership incentives on regressive analysis through introducing ROE(retum on equity), quantity of ownership, salary, pattern dummy variable and scale variable into the liner regression model.The thesis has three main conclusion: First, in 2003, 4.98% of the publicly listed Chinese stock companies exert executive ownership incentives, and they are mostly small-scale manufacture and commercial and information technology companies in Shanghai and Guangdong and Hubei province. Second, there is evident positive relevance between the executive salary and the performance of these companies, but the incentive efficiency of the executive ownership incentives is not very evident. Third, real pattern and phantom pattern have different impact on the company's performance, but this different is not very evident and stable.